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Privacy homomorphism is an important concept for encrypting clear data
while allowing one to perform operations on encrypted data without decryp-
tion. Although the use of fully homomorphic encryption schemes theoretically
allows for the secure evaluation of any function, the evaluation cost is still far
from being practical for many functions and no secure solutions have been
developed to satisfy the efficiency requirements.
In this thesis, the foundation of our simple framework is a set of optimized
circuits for the following operations: equality, greater-than comparison and
integer addition. We first focus on the applications of homomorphic encryp-
tion for private query processing on encrypted databases. In particular, we
construct a unified framework to efficiently and privately process queries
with “search” and “compute” operations by applying the underlying circuit
primitives.
Since genomic data contains numerous distinguishing features and sen-
sitive personal information, a privacy-preserving genome analysis in a cloud
computing environment becomes the major issue in bioinformatics. We present
a method to perform the exact edit distance algorithm on encrypted data to
i
ii
obtain an encrypted result. We also describe how to privately compute the ap-
proximate edit distance between encrypted DNA sequences. Finally we create
a homomorphic security system for searching a set of biomarkers to encrypted
genomes. We propose an efficient method to securely search a matching po-
sition with biomarker and extract the information of DNA sequences at the
position without complicated computation such as comparison.
Key words: homomorphic encryption, privacy query processing, SQL query,





1.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Private Databse Query Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Secure Genome Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Preliminaries 6
2.1 Practical Homomorphic Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 The BGV-Type Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 The YASHE Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3 The Ring-GSW Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Human Genome Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Primitive Arithmetic Circuits under Homomorphic Encryp-
tion 13
3.1 Binary Arithmetic Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.1 Equality Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.2 Greater-Than Comparison Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.3 Integer Addition Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.4 Maximum & Minimum Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Arithmetic Circuits over the Integers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1 Calibrating Binary Circuit Primitives . . . . . . . . . . 20
iii
CONTENTS
3.2.2 Arithmetic Circuits over the Integers Based on Fer-
mat’s Little Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.3 Arithmetic Circuits over the Integers Based on La-
grange Interpolation Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4 Private Database Query Processing 23
4.1 General-Purpose Search-and-Compute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1.1 A High-level Overview of Our Approach . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.2 Security Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2 Applications to Encrypted Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.1 Search Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.2 Search-and-Compute Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.3 Join Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3 Performance Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3.1 Larger Message Spaces with Lazy Carry
Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3.2 Calibrating Circuit Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.4 Implementation and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4.1 Adjusting the Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4.2 Experiments for Search Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4.3 Experiments for Search-and-Sum . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4.4 Experiments for Search-and-Count . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5 Handling Join Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5 Secure Genome Analysis Based on Homomorphic Encryp-
tion 43
5.1 Exact Edit Distance Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1.1 Encrypted Edit Distance Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1.2 Optimizations Based on Block Computation . . . . . . 45
5.1.3 Optimization of Encrypted Edit Distance Algorithm
Based on Pathfinding Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.1.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
iv
CONTENTS
5.2 Approximate Edit Distance Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2.1 Encoding Genomic Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.2.2 Secure DNA Sequence Comparison
with Bit-sliced Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2.3 Secure DNA Sequence Comparison
with Integer-based Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.3 Secure Searching of Biomarkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.3.1 Privacy-Preserving Database Searching
and Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.2 Secure Searching of Biomarkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.3.3 Optimization Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64








Privacy homomorphism is an important concept for encrypting clear data
while allowing one to perform operations on encrypted data without decryp-
tion. This concept was first introduced by Rivest et al. [RAD78] and, much
later, affirmed by Feigenbaum and Merritt’s question [FM91]. Is there an en-
cryption function Encp¨q such that both Encpx`yq and Encpx¨yq can be easily
computed from Encpxq and Encpyq? Since then, there have been a substantial
number of studies concerned with solving this problem. However, there had
been very little progress made in determining whether such efficient and se-
cure encryption schemes exist until 2009, when Craig Gentry demonstrated
the possibility of constructing such an encryption scheme [Gen09].
Roughly Gentry’s scheme allows anyone to compute Encpfpx1, . . . , xnqq
from a collection of encrypted data Encpx1q, . . . ,Encpxnq for any computable
function f without knowing the actual data. He called this technique a fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme.
While the use of Gentry’s scheme and other FHE schemes (e.g., [DGHV10,
BV11, BGV12]) allows us to securely evaluate any function in a theoretical
sense, the evaluation cost is still far from being practical for many func-





1.1.1 Private Databse Query Processing
Private query processing on encrypted databases allows users to obtain data
from encrypted databases in such a way that the users’ sensitive data are pro-
tected from exposure. Recently, Ada Popa et al. proposed CryptDB [PRZB11]
and its extension [TKMZ13], which can process general types of database
queries using layers of different encryption schemes: deterministic encryption
for equality condition queries, order-preserving encryption (OPE) for range
queries, and homomorphic encryption (HE) for aggregate queries. The dis-
advantage of their work is that in the long run, its privacy degrades to the
lowest level of data privacy provided by the weakest encryption scheme.
This observation leads to a natural question: Can we construct a solution
to efficiently perform such a database query without maintaining multiple
contexts of encryption? At first glance, HE schemes appear to perfectly satisfy
the requirement of processing queries on encrypted databases within a single
encryption context. However, no solutions exist for expressing and processing
various queries on fully encrypted databases in an efficient manner.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) A general framework
for private query evaluation, (ii) Optimization of circuits and their appli-
cations to compact expressions of queries, (iii) Further enhancement of the
performance of query evaluation. We provide a common platform to allow
database users to work on a single underlying cryptosystem, to represent their
queries as functions in a conceptually simple manner, and to efficiently per-
form these functions on fully encrypted databases. In order to optimize the
circuit primitives, we make extensive use of single-instruction-multiple-data
(SIMD) techniques to move data across plaintext slots. In general, SIMD
technology allows basic operations to be performed on several data elements
in parallel. In contrast, our proposal operates on packed ciphertexts of several
data elements and thus enables the efficiency of the basic operations of the
circuit primitives to be improved. Furthermore, we find that all circuit prim-
2
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itives have Oplog µq depth for µ-bit data. HE schemes typically use Z2 as a
message space, meaning that their encryption algorithm encrypts each bit of
a message. Although our circuit primitives function efficiently on bit encryp-
tions, we can achieve further improvements by adopting a large integer ring
(e.g., Z2t), particularly in the case of computing on encrypted numerical data.
Even for an integer of k bits with k ą t, addition can be performed using de-
gree 1 circuits by processing lazy carry operations. Although this rectification
requires modification of our circuit primitives, we can preserve their optimal-
ity through SIMD operations. In other words, search-and-compute queries
can be processed using only Oplog µq-depth circuits. Finally we perform com-
prehensive experiments to evaluate the performance of various queries using
our techniques from both a theoretical and a practical perspective.
1.1.2 Secure Genome Analysis
We consider the potential for using homomorphic encryption to protect pri-
vacy in genomic computations. There are many projects to collect DNA infor-
mation from participants in order to discover genomic sequences associated
with disease susceptibility. The Personal Genome Project (PGP) displays
genotypic and phenotypic information in a public database and the HapMap
Project has developed a public repository of genome sequences, which means
that genomic data has become publicly accessible. However, even anonymized
genomic data can leak significant information about the participants (see
for example [GMG`13, SAW13, EN14]). Even if DNA sequences are not
associated with explicit identifiers such as name, sex, date of birth, or ad-
dress, one can recover such personal data using re-identification methods:
genotype-phenotype inference [MS01], location-visit patterns [MS04], family
structure [HAHT13], and dictionary attacks. Thus DNA sequences are sensi-
tive and valuable enough that we should not reveal our own sequences even
when performing sequence analysis.
In this thesis, we focus on the well-known exact edit distance algorithm
by Wagner and Fisher, which measures the dissimilarity of two strings. We
3
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show that the algorithm can be implemented on two encrypted sequences of
lengths n and m with a somewhat homomorphic scheme of depth Oppn `
mq logplogpn`mqqq in Opnm logpn`mqq homomorphic computations. More-
over, we introduce an optimization technique to reduce the depth: Divide the
edit distance matrix into sub-blocks of size-pτ`1q and solve the edit distance
problem in each block. We can compute each of them diagonally, consuming
Opτq levels in one diagonal-round. Namely, evaluating the circuits in each
cell can be processed by a somewhat homomorphic encryption of a constant
depth. In particular, in the case of n “ m, we improved the efficiency of our
protocol with the pathfinding method. The improved protocol can reduce the
circuit depth and computational costs with accurate edit distance outputs.
We also propose efficient evaluation algorithms to compute the approxi-
mate edit distance on encrypted data which can be used in sequence align-
ment and gene finding. We adapt these methods to the practical HE schemes´
BGV-type scheme [GHS12] by Gentry, Halevi and Smart and YASHE scheme
[BLLN13] by Bos, Lauter, Loftus and Naehrig. We also compare the perfor-
mance of the two encryption schemes in these contexts.
Finally we suggest an efficient method to securely search biomarkers using
hybrid Ring-GSW homomorphic encryption scheme. The important feature of
our method is to encode a genomic database as a single element of polynomial
ring. The searching operation in a database is done by a single multiplication
with the encoded query gene, thus the information of DNA sequences at the
matched position (e.g., chromosome and position) is moved to the constant
term of output polynomial. Finally we perform the extraction procedure to
obtain the DNA sequence and compare it with the query DNA information
in plaintext. Our method has the advantage over previous methods in pa-
rameter size and computational complexity since it requires only a single
multiplication. Our implementation shows that the computation of search-
and-extract takes about 3.9 seconds while extracting respective two single
nucleotide polymorphisms of of reference and alternate (i.e., non-reference)
sequences in a database of size 4M.
4
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We will use bold-face lower-case letter a,b... to denote column vectors over
Z or any other ring R, and boldface upper-case letters A,B... for matrices.
The product symbol ¨ will be used for both inner product of two column
vectors, and for matrix product, to be interpreted as the only applicable one.
2.1 Practical Homomorphic Encryption
Fully Homomorphic cryptosystems allow us to homomorphically evaluate any
arithmetic circuit without decryption. However, the noise of the resulting ci-
phertext grows during homomorphic evaluations, slightly with addition but
substantially with multiplication. For efficiency reasons for tasks which are
known in advance, we use a more practical Somewhat Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (SHE) scheme, which evaluates functions up to a certain complexity. In
particular, two techniques are used for noise management of SHE: one is the
modulus-switching technique introduced by Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikun-
tanathan [BGV12], which scales down a ciphertext during every multipli-
cation operation and reduces the noise by its scaling factor. The other is a
scale-invariant technique proposed by Brakerski such that the same modulus
is used throughout the evaluation process [Bra12].
Let us denote by r¨sq the reduction modulo q into the interval p´q{2, q{2sX
6
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Z of the integer or integer polynomial (coefficient-wise). For a security pa-
rameter λ, we choose an integer m “ mpλq that defines the m-th cyclotomic
polynomial Φmpxq. For a polynomial ring R “ Zrxs{pΦmpxqq, set the plain-
text space to Rt :“ R{tR for some fixed t ě 2 and the ciphertext space to
Rq :“ R{qR for an integer q “ qpλq. Let χ “ χpλq denote a noise distribu-
tion over the ring R. We use the standard notation aÐ D to denote that a
is chosen from the distribution D.
The ring-based homomorphic encryption schemes are based on the (de-
cisional) Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) assumption, which was first
introduced by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [LPR10]. The assumption
is that it is infeasible to distinguish the following two distributions. The first
distribution consists of pairs pai, uiq, where ai, ui Ð Rq uniformly at random.
The second distribution consists of pairs of the form pai, biq“pai, ais ` eiq
where ai Ð Rq drawn uniformly and s, ei Ð χ .
2.1.1 The BGV-Type Scheme
Gentry, Halevi and Smart [GHS12] constructed an efficient BGV-type SHE
scheme. Note that we can generate RLWE samples as pai, ais ` teiq where t
and q are relatively prime. To improve efficiency for HE, they use very sparse
secret keys s with coefficients sampled from t´1, 0, 1u. Here is the somewhat
homomorphic encryption scheme of [GHS12]:
• BGV.ParamsGenpλq: Given the security parameter λ, choose an odd
integer m, a chain of moduli q0 ă q1 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă qL´1 “ q, a plaintext
modulus t with 1 ă t ă q0, and discrete Gaussian distribution χerr.
Output pm, tqiu, t, χerrq.
• BGV.KeyGenpm, tqiu, t, χerrq: On the input parameters, choose a ran-
dom s from t0,˘1uφpmq and generate an RLWE instance pa, bq “ pa, ras`
tesqq for eÐ χerr. We set the key pair: ppk, skq “ ppa, bq, sq with an eval-
uation key evk P R2P ¨qL´2 for a large integer P .
7
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• BGV.Encpm, pkq: To encrypt m P Rt, choose a small polynomial v and
two Gaussian polynomials e0, e1 over Rq and output the ciphertext
ct “ pc0, c1q “ pm, 0q ` pbv ` te0, av ` te1q P R2q.
• BGV.Decpct, skq: Given a ciphertext ct “ pc0, c1q at level l, output rc0´
s ¨ c1sql mod t where the polynomial rc0 ´ s ¨ c1sql is called the noise in
the ciphertext ct.
• BGV.Addpct, ct1q{BGV.Multpct, ct1, evkq: Given two ciphertexts ct “ pc0, c1q
and ct1 “ pc10, c
1





1sqlq. The homomorphic multiplication is com-
puted by ctmult “ SwitchKeypct˚ct







0, sql , rc1c
1
1sqlq and the key switching function SwitchKey is used to re-
duce the size of ciphertexts to two ring elements. We also apply modulus
switching from qi to qi´1 in order to reduce the noise. If we reach the
smallest modulus q0, we can no longer compute on ciphertexts.
Smart and Vercauteren [SV14] observed that the polynomial ring Rt is
isomorphic to
ś`
i“1 Ztrxs{fipxq if Φmpxq factors modulo t into ` irreducible
factors fipxq of the same degree. Namely, a plaintext polynomial m can be
considered as a vector of ` small polynomials, m mod fi, called plaintext slots.
We can also transform the plaintext vector pm1, . . . ,mrq P
ś`
i“1 Ztrxs{fipxq
to an element m P Rt using the polynomial Chinese Remainder Theo-
rem (i.e., m “ CRTpm1, . . . ,mrq). In particular, it is possible to add and mul-
tiply on the slots: if m,m1 P Rt encode pm1, . . . ,m`q and pm
1
1, . . . ,m
1
`q respec-
tively, then we see that m`m1 “ mi`m
1
i mod fi and m¨m
1 “ mi ¨m
1
i mod fi.
This technique was adapted to the BGV scheme.
2.1.2 The YASHE Scheme
The practical SHE scheme, YASHE, was proposed in [BLLN13] based on
combining ideas from [Bra12, SS11, LATV12]. The security of this scheme is
based on the hardness of the RLWE assumption similar to the one for BGV.
8
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It also relies on the Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR) assumption
which was introduced by Lopez-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan [LATV12].
Let t P Rˆq be invertible in Rq, yi P Rq and zi “ yi{t (mod q) for i “ 1, 2.
For z P Rq, we define χz “ χ ` z to be the distribution shifted by z. The
assumption is that it is hard to distinguish elements of the form h “ a{b,
where aÐ y1` tχz1 , bÐ y2` tχz2 , from elements drawn uniformly from Rq.
The YASHE scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• YASHE.ParamsGenpλq: Given the security parameter λ, choose m to be
a power of two, modulus q and t with 1 ă t ă q, truncated discrete
Gaussian distribution χerr on R such that the coefficients of the poly-
nomial are selected in the range r´Bpλq, Bpλqs), and an integer base
ω ą 1. Output pm, q, t, χerr, ωq.
• YASHE.KeyGenpm, q, t, χerr, ωq: On the input parameters, sample f 1, g Ð
t0,˘1uφpmq and set f “ rtf 1 ` 1sq. If f is not invertible modulo q,
choose a new f 1 and compute the inverse f´1 P R of f modulo q and set




Sample e, s Ð χ
`ω,q
err and compute γ “ rPω,qpfq ` e` hssq P R`ω,qq . Then
we set the key pair: ppk, sk, evkq “ ph, f, γq.
• YASHE.Encpm, pkq: To encrypt m P Rt, choose e, s Ð χerr and then













¨ rf ¨ ctsq
T
mod t.
The inherent noise in the ciphertext is defined as the minimum value
of infinite norm ||v||8 “ maxi t|vi|u such that f ¨ ct “ t
t
q
u ¨ rmst ` v
pmod qq.
• YASHE.Addpct, ct1q{YASHE.Multpct, ct1, evkq: Given two ciphertexts ct
and ct1, homomorphic addition is computed as ctadd “ rct ` ct
1sq. Ho-








, evkq where the key switching function SwitchKey is used to trans-
9
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form a ciphertext decryptable under the original secret key f (see
[BLLN13] for details).
2.1.3 The Ring-GSW Scheme
Gentry, Sahai, and Waters [GSW13] suggested a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion based on the LWE problem, where the message is encrypted as an ap-
proximate eigenvalue of a ciphertext. Ducas and Micciancio [DM15] described
its RLWE variant. The RGSW symmetric encryption scheme consists of the
following algorithms.
• RGSW.ParamsGenpλq: Given the security parameter λ, choose m to be
a power of two, modulus q with 1 ă q, discrete Gaussian distribution
χerr of parameter ς, and an integer base Bg. Output pm, q, χerr, Bgq.
• RGSW.KeyGenpm, q, χerr, Bgq: On the input parameters, choose a poly-
nomial s P Rq which is chosen uniformly at random and set the secret
key sk “ s.
• RGSW.Encpm, skq: Let dg “ rlogBgpqqs and n “ φpmq “ m{2. To en-
crypt m P Rt, pick a P R2dgQ uniformly at random, and e P R2dg » Z2dgn
with discrete Gaussian distribution χ of parameter ς, and output the
ciphertext
ct “ ra, a ¨ s` es `mG P R2dgˆ2q
where G “ pI, BgI, . . . , B
dg´1
g Iq P R2dgˆ2q .
• RGSW.Decpct, skq: Let pc0, c1q P R2q be the first row vector of the given
ciphertext ct. Output c0 ´ c1 ¨ s pmod qq.
Let WDBgp¨q be the decomposition with the base Bg, where the dimen-
sion of input vector is multiplied by dg through this algorithm. The RGSW





m is an approximate eigenvalue of WDBgpCTq with respect to the eigenvector







2.2 Human Genome Comparison
Assume that there are two strings α “ α1 . . . αn and β “ β1 . . . βm over an
alphabet Σ. One can make another string with the same length by inserting
spaces “´ ”, called gaps, and consider a matrix having two rows with these
new strings. A gap in the first (resp. second) row is called Insertion (resp.
Deletion). A column with the same (resp. distinct) characters is called Match
(resp. Mismatch). Then the edit distance between two strings is the minimum
number of these edit operations needed to transform one string into the other.





0 if αi “ βj pMatchq,
1 if αi ‰ βj pMismatchq.
In Algorithm 1, we describe the Wagner-Fischer edit distance algorithm [WF74],
and the edit distance is simply Dpn,mq.
Algorithm 1 Exact Edit Distance Algorithm
1: for iÐ 0 to n do
2: Di,0 Ð i
3: end for
4: for iÐ 0 to n do
5: for j Ð 0 to m do
6: D0,j Ð j
7: end for
8: end for
9: for iÐ 0 to n do
10: for j Ð 0 to m do
11: sÐ pαi “ βjq? 0 : 1




Tang et al. suggested an algorithm to compute the approximate edit dis-
tance between genome sequences. Suppose that two participants have Vari-
ation Call Format (VCF) files which contain genotype information such as
11
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Algorithm 2 Approximate Edit Distance Algorithm
1: eÐ 0
2: for i P L do
3: if xi ““ ‘H’ then
4: Dpxiq Ð 0
5: else if ‘xi.sv’ ““ ‘DEL’ then
6: Dpxiq Ð lenpxi.ref)
7: else
8: Dpxiq Ð lenpxi.alt)
9: end if
10: Define Dpyiq with the same way as Dpxiq
11: if ppxi.ref ““ yi.refq and pxi.alt ““ yi.altqq then
12: ei Ð 0
13: else
14: ei Ð maxtDpxiq, Dpyiqu
15: end if
16: eÐ e` ei
17: end for
18: return e
chromosome number, position, reference and alternate sequences, where each
base must be one of a single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP): A, T, G, C.
They also summarize some variants compared with reference genome (e.g., in-
sertion, deletion, or substitution). If there is only one record in VCF files at
a specified location, the other one is considered to be an empty set (‘H’).
Let L be a list indexed by the positions of two participants. Then we
can define the approximate edit distance as described in Algorithm 2, where
“xi.sv” denotes the type of structural variant relative to the reference, “xi.ref ”
the reference bases and “xi.alt” the alternate alleles. More precisely, given
two data xi and yi, at the same locus from two samples, if xi includes an
insertion or deletion compared with the reference while yi does not, use xi’s
distance as the edit distance at the current locus and then realign them to
skip the inserted or deleted subsequences. If both of them have insertion or
deletion at the same locus, choose the larger one as the approximation for






We devise three primitives with bitwise encodings: an equality circuit, a com-
parison circuit and an integer addition circuit. We focus on a method for
optimizing these circuits with respect to their depth and required homomor-
phic operations. For this purpose, we use SIMD along with automorphism
operations. We also present the integer-based arithmetic circuits for equality
and comparison.
Notation. All logarithms are base 2 unless otherwise indicated. By abuse
of notation, we use “+” to denote homomorphic addition and HA to denote
the number of additions. Similarly, for homomorphic multiplication, we use
“¨” and HM. When we say the (multiplicative) depth DpCq of a circuit C under
homomorphic encryption, it means the total number of reduced levels in the
circuit that is being evaluated homomorphically. Similarly HMpCq denotes
the number of homomorphic multiplications during evaluation.
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3.1 Binary Arithmetic Circuits
When input messages are decomposed and encrypted in a bitwise manner,
the encryption x̄ of a message x “ xµ ¨ ¨ ¨ x2x1 means tx̄1, x̄2, . . . , x̄µu, where
xi P t0, 1u.
3.1.1 Equality Circuit
For two µ-bit integers x and y, we define an arithmetic circuit for the equality
test as follows:
equalpx, yq “ ^µi“1 p1‘ xi ‘ yiq , (3.1.1)
where we denote the XOR and AND gate by ‘ and ^. The output of
equalp¨, ¨q is 1 in the case of equality and 0 otherwise. In the bit-sliced
implementation, we assume that one ciphertext is used per bit; therefore,
we have a total of 2µ ciphertexts to evaluate the equality test. If, rather
than performing regular multiplication, we multiply each term after form-
ing a binary-tree structure, the depth of the equal circuit becomes log µ.
Specifically, the algorithm requires two homomorphic additions to compute
1` x̄i ` ȳi and requires that µ ciphertexts be multiplied by each other while
consuming log µ depth.
Our optimizations are focused on minimizing the number of homomorphic
operations performed, particularly homomorphic multiplications. As shown
by Smart and Vercauteren [SV14], we can pack each bit xi into a single
ciphertext. Next, we expand the right-hand side of Equation (3.1.1) and
rearrange each term for convenience in SIMD execution. Then, we repeatedly
apply SIMD operations to a vector of SIMD words. This procedure is the key
to reduce the number of homomorphic multiplications from µ ´ 1 to log µ.
We provide a better description of the complexity in Table 3.1.
For example, we consider the equal circuit for µ “ 4. We can pack each bit
xi and yi into a corresponding single ciphertext. The application of the SIMD
operations on this circuit is described in Fig. 3.1. The left side represents the
execution over plaintext slots and the right side represents the execution
14
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Figure 3.1: An Illustration of SIMD Execution for the equal Circuit
over the corresponding ciphertexts. We denote by z̄piq the vector obtained by
applying rotation by i to each element in z̄. Namely, we implement a single
automorphism X ÞÑ Xg
i
for some element g P Z˚m of order µ in the original
group Z˚m and the quotient group Z˚m{xty. In Fig. 3.1, a rotation operation
X ÞÑ Xg is applied to the encryption x̄ ` ȳ ` 1 for some element g P Z˚m of
order µ “ 4. Following the first SIMD homomorphic multiplication, we can
obtain the encryption, which is entirely in the form of multiplications of two
pxi` yi`1q’s. In general, the parallel SIMD computation allows the equality
circuit to be evaluated using an SWHE of depth log µ in log µ homomorphic
multiplications.
3.1.2 Greater-Than Comparison Circuit
For two unsigned µ-bit integers x and y, the circuit compx, yq outputs 0 if
x ě y and 1 otherwise. This operation can be recursively defined as follows:
compx, yq “ cµ, (3.1.2)
where ci “ p1‘ xiq ^ yi ` p1‘ xi ‘ yiq ^ c̄i´1 for i ě 2 with an initial value
c1 “ p1‘ x1q ^ y1.
15
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As the first step of optimization, we express Equation (3.1.2) in the fol-
lowing closed form:




pp1‘ xiq ^ yi ^ di`1di`2 ^ dµq ,
where dk “ p1 ‘ xk ‘ ykq. Because it has degree µ ` 1, we can deduce that
the depth of the circuit is logpµ ` 1q. Then it is easy to see that a näıve
construction of the circuit incurs Opµ2q homomorphic multiplications.
The key observation is that the closed form is expressed as a sum of
products of p1 ` x̄iq ¨ ȳi and p1 ` x̄i ` ȳiq terms for i P r1, µs. We are able
to compute p1` x̄iq ¨ ȳi for all i using only 1 homomorphic multiplication by
applying the SIMD technique. Now, we must compute
śµ
k“i`1 d̄k for each i P
r1, µ´1s. As stated above, a näıve method incurs Opµ2q; however, using SIMD
operations requires one to perform only 2µ´4 homomorphic multiplications,
thereby consuming log µ depth. Finally, we need to multiply p1 ` x̄iq ¨ ȳi by
the result of the above computation, which also incurs only 1 homomorphic
multiplication. Thus, the total number of homomorphic multiplications is
equal to 2µ´ 2.
Remark 3.1.1. We can address signed numbers by slightly modifying the
circuit. Assume that we place a sign bit in the leftmost position of a value
(e.g., 0 for a positive number and 1 for a negative number) and use the
two’s-complement system. Then, for two µ-bit values x and y, compx̄, ȳq “
c̄µ ` x̄µ ` ȳµ. It is evident that the case of two positive numbers corresponds
to x̄µ “ ȳµ “ 0̄.
3.1.3 Integer Addition Circuit
Suppose that for two µ-bit integers x and y and for an integer ν ą µ, we
construct two ν-bit integers by padding with zeros on the left. Then a size-ν
full adder faddν is recursively defined as follows:
faddν px, yq “ ps1, s2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , sνq,
16
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with the sums si “ xi ‘ yi ‘ ci´1 and the carry-outs ci “ pxi ^ yiq `
‘ ppxi ‘ yiq ^ ci´1q for i P r2, νs with initial values s1 “ x1 ‘ y1 and c1 “
x1^y1. The primary reason for considering such a large full adder is to cover
SQL aggregate functions with many additions.
Our strategy for optimization is the same as above. Namely, we express
each sum and carry in closed form and minimize the number of homomor-
phic operations using SIMD operations. Consequently, the s̄i’s are written
as follows: s̄i “ x̄i ` ȳi `
ři´1
j“1 tij, where tij “ px̄j ¨ ȳjq
ś
j`1ďkďi´1 px̄k ` ȳkq
for j ă i ´ 1 and ti,i´1 “ x̄i´1 ¨ ȳi´1. When i “ ν and j “ 1, because ν ´ 2
homomorphic multiplications are required, the circuit has logpν ´ 2q depth.
However, we must perform an additional multiplication by x̄j ¨ ȳj. Thus, the
total depth amounts to logpν ´ 2q ` 1. As before, the use of SIMD and par-
allelism via automorphism allows us to evaluate the integer addition circuit









com 1` log µ
fadd 1` log pν ´ 2q
Comp.:
equal 2HA` plog µqHM
com pµ` 1` log µqHA` p2µ´ 2qHM
fadd νHA` p3ν ´ 5qHM
:Comp.: Computational complexity during homomorphic evaluations
3.1.4 Maximum & Minimum Circuits
In the following, we show that the comparison circuit leads to the the mini-
mum circuits.
17
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Lemma 3.1.1. Given two µ-bit values x “ xµ . . . x1 and y “ yµ . . . y1, then
z “ zµ . . . z1 is the minimum value of x and y where
zi “ pcompx, yq ^ xiq ‘ p1‘ compx, yq ^ yiq .
Proof. Let us denote a multiplication over integers by “ ¨ ”. Then it is true
that
mintx, yu “ compx, yq ¨ x` p1‘ compx, yqq ¨ y





















pcompx, yq ¨ xiq ` pp1‘ compx, yqq ¨ yiq
˘
¨ 2i´1,
where the inputs x and y can be written as binary representations in the sec-
ond line. Since “compx, yq¨xi” and “p1‘ compx, yqq¨yi” cannot simultaneously
be “1”, the lemma follows.




min2i “ pcompx, yq ^ xiq ‘ pp1‘ compx, yqq ^ yiq .
Then one can evaluate these circuits homomorphically with a SWHE scheme
of depth plogpµ´1q`2q. We also obtain a natural generalization of computing
the minimum value between many numbers: apply repeatedly the minimum
circuits. Then this naive method has Dpmin2q “ plogpµ´ 1q ` 2q ¨ plog kq.
On the other hand, we consider another way to compute the minimum
value which requires circuits of lesser depth: Given µ-bit values x1, . . . , xk,
18
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compx1, x2q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ compx1, xkq if j “ 1,
p1‘ compx1, xjqq ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ p1‘ compxj´1, xjqq^








if j “ k.
It is easy to show that this method has




pµ´ 1q logpµ´ 1q
2
˙
pk ´ 1qpk ´ 2q
2
` k pk ´ 2` µq .
More specifically, it first needs logpµ´ 1q ` 1 levels to compute compxi, xjq’s
by Lemma 1. Then it requires logpk ´ 1q levels to compute cj for 1 ď j ď k
by multiplying compxi, xjq’s with a binary tree. Finally, the claim follows
because we need one more level to compute cj ^ x
j
i .
3.2 Arithmetic Circuits over the Integers
We now present the integer-based arithmetic circuits for equality and com-
parison. We first describe the basic concept that underlies our modifications
of the binary arithmetic circuits as described above. We also represent the
arithmetic circuits over the integers by using Fermat’s Little Theorem and
Lagrange Interpolation Formula.
Note that if the plaintext modulus is sufficiently large, we are able to per-
form addition without overflow in the plaintext space. This means addition
can be securely performed with degree 1 circuit.
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3.2.1 Calibrating Binary Circuit Primitives
It is well known that for x, y P t0, 1u, the following properties hold:
x‘ y “ x` y ´ 2 ¨ x ¨ y and x^ y “ x ¨ y,
where `, ´, and ¨ are arithmetic operations over the integers. Based on this














For only a small additional cost, we can construct a new arithmetic circuit
for an equality test operating under homomorphic encryption. Next, consider
the com circuit over the integers. Recall that the closed form of cµ is




p1´ xiq ¨ yi ¨ pdi`1di`2 ¨ ¨ ¨ dµq.
Rather than dj “ p1` xj ` yjq, we set
dj “ p1` 2 ¨ xj ¨ yj ´ yj ´ xjq ¨ p1` 2 ¨ xj ¨ yj ´ 2yjq.
However, the number of ciphertexts is still too large since it requires bit-
wise encodings for equality and comparison and each bit is considered as an
element of large message space.
3.2.2 Arithmetic Circuits over the Integers Based on
Fermat’s Little Theorem
It follows from Fermat’s Little Theorem that if x P Z and p is a prime not
dividing x, then p divides xp´1 ´ 1, that is, xp´1 ” 1 pmod pq. Then we can
20
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1 if x “ k
0 o.w.
” 1´ px´ kqp´1 pmod pq,
which implies that equalpx, yq ” 10px´ yq pmod pq.
Similary, we consider the indicator function of the set r0, p´1
2















ă x ď p´ 1.












1kpxq pmod pq. Thus the com circuit is represented as




pry ´ xspq pmod pq. Even though there are not so many
ciphertexts compared with the method in Section 3.2.1, they require large
depth as about log p and high complexity as log p and Opp log pq for the
equality and greater-than comparison circuits, respectively.
3.2.3 Arithmetic Circuits over the Integers Based on
Lagrange Interpolation Formula





1 if x “ k,








px´ iq pmod pq.
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If precomputing Mk as a constant value, the total depth is log `` 2. We can





1 if x P r0, `s



















If precomputing Mk’s as constant values, the total depth can be reduced to
about log 2`.
Now suppose that the difference between x and y is less than `. Then
we can derive the arithmetic circuits using the defined indicator functions as
follows:
• equalpx, yq “ 10px´ yq
• compx, yq “ 1r0,`spry ´ xspq
• minpx, yq “ compx, yq ¨ px´ yq ` y
Therefore, a SWHE scheme of depth log ` can evaluate the equality cir-






In this section, we demonstrate how to efficiently perform queries on en-
crypted data using the proposed circuit primitives. We first describe our
techniques in a general setting and then show how our ideas apply to database
applications.
4.1 General-Purpose Search-and-Compute
We begin by describing our basic idea for performing a search operation over
encrypted data. We assume that a collection of data is partitioned into N
µ-bit items denoted by R1 ‖ ¨ ¨ ¨ ‖ RN and that the data have been encrypted
and stored in the form of R̄1 ‖ ¨ ¨ ¨ ‖ R̄N .
For a predicate ϕ on a ciphertext C, a search on encrypted data outputs
R̄i if ϕpR̄iq “ 1̄ and 0̄ otherwise. More formally, let ϕ : C Ñ t0̄, 1̄u be a
predicate on encrypted data. Then, we say that Sϕ : CN Ñ CN is a search on
the encrypted data and is defined as follows:
SϕpR̄1, . . . , R̄Nq :“ pϕpR̄1q ¨ R̄1, . . . , ϕpR̄Nq ¨ R̄Nq.
We then extend this operation to a more general operation on encrypted
23
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data, i.e., a search-and-compute operation on encrypted data, as follows. Let
F : CN Ñ C be an arithmetic function on encryptions. Then, for a restricted
search Sϕ : CN Ñ CN , we say that pF ˝ SϕqpR̄1, . . . , R̄Nq is a search-and-
compute operation on encryptions.
Furthermore, we quantify the efficiency of such search-and-compute op-
erations on encrypted data in Theorem 4.1.1. This theorem states that if we
can perform a search on encrypted data restricted by a ϕ that specifies only
the equality operator, then a search query on the encrypted data requires
Np2HA ` log µHMq homomorphic operations in total. If the predicate ϕ al-
lows one to specify all the comparison operators in the set tă,ď,ą,ě,‰u,
then we can perform SϕpR̄1, . . . , R̄Nq using OpµNq homomorphic multiplica-
tions.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let HMpϕq and HMpF q be the total numbers of homo-
morphic multiplications for ϕ and F , respectively. Then, we can perform
pF ˝ SϕqpR̄1, . . . , R̄Nq using OpNpHMpϕqq ` HMpF qq homomorphic opera-
tions. Specifically, we can perform a search on encrypted data restricted by ϕ
using at most OpNpHMpϕqqq homomorphic operations.
Proof. Because homomorphic multiplication dominates the performance of
the operation, we may consider only operations of this type. Because the
predicate ϕ requires OpHMpϕqq homomorphic operations, we see that Sϕ
requires OpNpHMpϕqqq homomorphic operations to compute the predicate
N times. Thus, the operation uses OpHMpF qq homomorphic operations to
evaluate an arithmetic function F on encrypted data. Therefore, we can
conclude that the total computation complexity of the search-and-compute
operation on encryptions is OpNpHMpϕqq `HMpF qq. In particular, when we
consider a search on encrypted data, F can be regarded as the identity map.
Therefore, we can perform a search on encrypted data restricted by ϕ using
at most OpNpHMpϕqqq homomorphic operations.
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4.1.1 A High-level Overview of Our Approach
Figure 4.1 graphically illustrates the high-level architecture of our approach.
Assuming a database consisting of N blocks, i.e., R1 ‖ R2 ‖ ¨ ¨ ¨ ‖ RN ,
to encrypt the record Ri, a DB user prepares a pair of public/private keys
ppk, skq for an FHE scheme and publishes the public key to a DB server. The
DB users store their encrypted records R̄i “ EncpRi, pkq for 1 ď i ď N in the
same way as normal write queries (e.g., using the insert-into statement).
We use an efficient variant of an FHE scheme: a somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme.
Suppose that the user wants to submit a retrieval query Q to the DB
server. Before being submitted, the queryQ needs to be properly pre-processed
so that all clear messages, such as constant values, are encrypted under the
public key pk. We denote this transformed query by Q̄.
Upon receiving Q̄, the DB server compiles it into Q̄˚ by applying our
techniques. The readers can consider a dedicated module for performing this
task.˚ Hereafter, we call the module a Private Search-and-compute (PSnC)
processor. Next, the DB server homomorphically evaluates Q̄˚ over the fully
encrypted databases and returns the resulting ciphertexts to the user.
The DB user can decrypt the output using his private key sk while learning
no additional data except for the records satisfying the where conditions.
4.1.2 Security Evaluation
Secrecy against a semi-honest DB server is ensured because encrypted data
cannot be leaked due to the semantic security of our underlying SWHE
scheme. Secrecy against a semi-honest DB user therefore follows because the
result of a query expressed by our circuit primitives is equivalent to 0̄ if the
specified conditions do not hold; therefore, the resulting ciphertext is equal
to 0̄. This implies that the evaluated ciphertexts do not leak any information
˚Alternatively, one may imagine that Q̄˚ transformed by the DB user directly is sent
to the DB server. However, considering optimization and performance, we believe that the
better choice involves the module becoming part of the DBMS.
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Figure 4.1: Our PSnC Framework
except for the number of unsatisfied tuples.
4.2 Applications to Encrypted Databases
We use RpA1, . . . , Adq to denote a relation schema R of degree d consisting of
attributes A1, . . . , Ad, and we use Āj to denote the corresponding encrypted
attribute. As mentioned above, we use A
piq
j to denote the j-th attribute value
of the i-th tuple, and for convenience, we assume that each has a length of
µ bits.
4.2.1 Search Queries
Simple Selection Queries. Consider a simple retrieval query, as follows:
select Aj1 , . . . , Ajs from R where Aj0 “ α; (Q.1)
where α is a constant value.


















for each i P r1, N s. It follows from Theorem 4.1.1 that pQ̄˚.1q has the com-
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pQ̄˚.2q 1` logµ` log τ
Comp.
pQ̄˚.1q 2NHA`N p1` logµqHM
pQ̄˚.2q 2τNHA` τN p1` logµqHM
plexity evaluation given in Table 4.1.
Conjunctive & Disjunctive Queries. The query pQ.1q can be extended
by adding one or more conjunctive or disjunctive conditions to the where
clause. Consider a conjunctive query as follows:
select Aj1 , . . . , Ajs
from R
where Aj11 “ α1 and ¨ ¨ ¨ and Aj1τ “ ατ ;
(Q.2)



















A disjunctive query whose logical connectives are all ors can also be eval-
















With τ denoting the number of connectives, pQ̄˚.2q requires an additional
depth of log τ compared with pQ̄˚.1q to compute the multiplications among
the τ equality tests. Table 4.1 reports the complexity analysis.
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4.2.2 Search-and-Compute Queries
We continue to present important real constructions as an extension of Theo-
rem 4.1.1, in which F is one of the built-in SQL aggregate functions: sum, avg, count
and max. We begin with the case of F “ sum.
Search-and-sum Query. Consider the following sum query:
select sumpAj1q from R where Aj0 “ α; (Q.3)
As mentioned above, because our plaintext space is Z2, repeatedly ap-
plying simple homomorphic additions does not ensure correctness, which is
the motivation for our integer addition circuit (see Section 3.1.3). Using this















Because the result of the search-and-sum query is less than 2µN , using a
full adder of size ν “ µ ` logN to add all the values is sufficient. Using our
optimized equality circuit, pQ̄˚.3q requires N equality tests in total and N
homomorphic multiplications for each result of the test. Thus, the total com-
putational cost is p2N ` νpN ´ 1qqHA`pN p1` log µq` pN ´ 1q p3ν ´ 5qHM
with the depth 1` log µ` logN p1` logpν ´ 2qq according to Theorem 4.2.1
below.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let |R| denote the cardinality of a set of tuples from a
relation schema R. Suppose that all keyword attributes in the where clause
and all numerical attributes in the select clause have }kwd} bits and }num}
bits, respectively. Then, a search-and-sum query can be processed with the
depth 1` rlogp}kwd}qs` rlog |R|s ¨ p1` rlog p}num} ` rlog |R|s´ 2qsq .
Proof. The query pQ̄˚.3q consumes 1 ` rlogp}kwd}qs levels for the computa-
tion of all equality tests. Then, it performs p|R| ´ 1q full-adder operations
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on the results, each of which is of size p}num} ` rlog |R|sq and consumes
p1` rlog p}num} ` rlog |R|s´ 2qsq levels.
Search-and-Count Query. We observe that search-and-count queries can
be processed in a similar manner. For example, assume a search-and-count
query with countp˚q in place of sumpAj1q in pQ.3q. This query can also be










Search-and-Avg Query. To process a search-and-compute query with the
avg aggregate function, it is sufficient to compute multiple search-and-sum
queries because an average can then be obtained by applying one division
after decryption.
Search-and-Max(Min) Query. It is evident that one can obtain the max
(or min) aggregate function by repeatedly applying the com circuit primitive.
4.2.3 Join Queries
Now, we design join queries within the search-and-compute paradigm. Sup-
pose that we have another relation SpB1, . . . , Beq consisting of M tuples,
where M ď N . First, we consider a simple join query, as follows:
select r.Aj1 , . . . , r.Ajs , s.Bj11 , . . . , s.Bj1s1
from R as r, S as s
where r.Ajk “ s.Bj1k1 ;
(Q.4)




















, . . .
¯
. (Q̄˚.4)
For fixed i and i1, we suppose that each numeric-type attribute is packed
in only one ciphertext. Then, the only difference from pQ̄˚.1q is that pQ̄˚.4q
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requires two homomorphic multiplications by the results of the search oper-
ations; thus, we must perform NM equality tests in total. Hence, the depth
of the circuit needed to process pQ̄˚.4q is 1 ` log µ, and the computational
complexity is p2NMqHA`NM p2` log µqHM.
Next, we consider an advanced join query pQ.5q with two aggregate func-
tions sumpr.Ajq and countp˚q and the same simple condition as for pQ.4q
Assuming sumpr.Ajq ă 2
µNM , we use a full adder of size ν “ µ` log pNMq.
By contrast, the result of countp˚q is ă NM , and it is sufficient to use a full

































With respect to sumpr.Ajq, this is identical to pQ̄
˚.3q except for the number
of operands of the additions. Therefore, the depth for evaluation amounts
to 1` log µ` logpNMq p1` logpν ´ 2qq , and the computation complexity is
p2NM ` νpNM ´ 1qqHA` pNM p1` log µq ` pNM ´ 1q p3ν ´ 5qqHM.
4.3 Performance Improvement
There is still room to further improve the performance of the circuit prim-
itives in Section 3. Our strategies consist of three interrelated components:
switching the message space Z2 to Zt; adapting the circuit primitives to Zt;
and fine-tuning the circuit primitives, again using SIMD operations.
4.3.1 Larger Message Spaces with Lazy Carry
Processing
If we encrypt messages in a bit-by-bit manner, the primary advantage is that
the two comparison operations are very cheap; however, applying an integer
addition circuit to encrypted data is expensive (see Table 4.2). Instead, it
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would be of substantial benefit to take the message domain to be a large
integer ring if doing so would allow one to efficiently evaluate the addition
circuit with much lesser depth. One of the important motivations for using
such a large message space is that the bit length of the keyword attributes
(e.g., ď 20 bits) in the where clause is generally smaller than that of the
numeric-type attributes (e.g., ě 30 bits) in the select clause.













therefore, it is sufficient to compute
ř
irA
piqsk over the integers. Assuming
that the plaintext modulus t is sufficiently large, we are able to perform
addition without overflow in Zt. Note that we only need to process carry
operations after computing each of them over the large integer ring.
To verify the performance improvement achieved through integer encod-
ing, we report the running time for each circuit primitive in Table 4.2. We
suspect that integer encoding yields greater benefits in the performance of
search-and-compute queries because aggregate functions rely extensively on
addition. The experimental results presented in Table 4.2 used 102 integers
in Zt randomly generated by the NTL library routines.
Table 4.2: Running-time comparisons in Z2 and Z214
Msg Space
equal com add
(10 bits) (10 bits) (30 bits)
Z2 2.2621 ms 8.5906 ms 228.5180 ms
Z214 208.6543 ms 307.5200 ms 0.0004 ms
4.3.2 Calibrating Circuit Primitives
It is clear that the use of a different message space must result in modi-
fications to our circuit primitives. Prior to discussing our modifications in
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detail, we must determine certain lower bounds on the depth for homomor-
phic multiplication as a function of t. We have two types of homomorphic
multiplications: multiplying a ciphertext by another ciphertext and multiply-
ing a ciphertext by a known constant. We formally state the corresponding
depth bounds in Theorem 4.3.1.
Theorem 4.3.1. Suppose that the native message space of the BGV cryp-
tosystem is a polynomial ring ZtrXs{xΦmpXqy and that a chain of moduli is
defined by a set of primes of approximately the same size, p0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pL, that is,
the i-th modulus qi is defined as qi “
śi
k“0 pk. For simplicity, assume that p
is the size of the pks. Let us denote by h the Hamming weight of the secret
key. For i ď j, let C and C 1 be normal ciphertexts at levels i and j, respec-
tively. Then, the depth for the multiplication of C and C 1, which is denoted by
d̃, is the smallest nonnegative integer that satisfies the following inequality:
t2 ¨φpmq¨p1`hq¨prq´1i stq
2 ă 6p2¨d̃. In addition, the depth for the multiplication
of c by a constant, which is denoted by d̃c, is the smallest nonnegative integer
for which the following inequality holds: φpmq ¨ pt{2q2 ă p2¨d̃c .
Proof. Before multiplying two ciphertexts, we set their noise magnitude to
be smaller than the pre-set constant B “ t2φpmqp1 ` hq{12 via modulus
switching. Subsequently, we obtain a tensor product of the ciphertexts, and
the result has a noise magnitude of 2Bprq´1i stq
2. Next, scale-down is per-
formed by removing small primes pk from the current prime set of the ten-
sored ciphertext; we use ∆ to denote the product of the removed primes. We
then have 2B2prq´1i stq
2{∆2 ă B. By assumption, it may be considered that
∆ “ pd̃, which means that d̃ is the smallest nonnegative integer that satisfies
the inequality 2Bprq´1i stq
2 ă p2¨d̃.
We now consider the case in which c is multiplied by a constant. As
above, we obtain a noise estimate of B ¨φpmq ¨ pt{2q2. Thus, we see that d̃c is
the smallest nonnegative integer that satisfies the inequality φpmq ¨ pt{2q2 ă
p2¨d̃c .
Table 4.3 presents the complexity results for search-and-compute queries
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on encrypted databases of N tuples with µ-bit attributes that are obtained
when using the new message space Zt.





equal p2` log µq d̃` d̃c
conjτ p2` log µ` log τq d̃` d̃c
com p4` log µq d̃` d̃c
Comp.
equal p4N ´ 1qHA`N p3` log µqHM
conjτ pp3τ ` 1qN ´ 1qHA` τN p3` log µqHM
com pN pµ` 5` log µq ´ 1qHA`N p2µ` 1qHM
4.4 Implementation and Discussion
This section demonstrates the performance of query processing expressed by
our optimized circuit primitives. The essential goal of the experiments in
this section is to verify the efficiency of our solution in terms of performance.
Thus, we reported the experimental results for each query. We performed a
somewhat fair comparison with the prior related works in [LNV11, BGH`13],
although each work is fairly different from its underlying SWHE scheme and
experimental settings.
All experiments reported in our paper were performed on a machine with
an Intel Xeon 2.3 GHz processor with 192 GB of main memory running a
Linux 3.2.0 operating system. All methods were implemented using the GCC
compiler version 4.2.1. In our experiments, we used a variant of a BGV-type
SWHE scheme [GHS12] with Shoup’s NTL library [S`01] and Shoup-Halevi’s
HE library [HS13]. Throughout this section, when we measured the average
running times, we excluded computing times used in data encryption and
decryption.
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4.4.1 Adjusting the Parameters
Without a loss of generality, we assume that the bit length of keyword at-
tributes in the where clause is 10-bit and that of numeric-type attributes in
the select clause is 30-bit. The keyword attributes are expressed in a bit-
by-bit manner, and each bit is an element of Z2r . In addition, numeric-type
attributes are expressed by the radix 2ω but are still in the same space Z2r .
We begin by observing the following relation among the parameters. At
this point, we consider the selectivity of a selection condition, which means
the fraction of tuples that satisfies the condition, and we denote it by ε.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let A be a numeric-type attribute. For a positive integer





0 ď rAsk ă 2
ω. Then, to process a search-and-sum query, one can take a
plaintext modulus with r “ Θpω ` logpε ¨ Nqq. Similarly, for a search-and-
count query, it suffices to choose the parameter r so that r “ Θplogpε ¨Nqq.
Proof. The goal of the theorem is to provide a bound for the size of a plaintext
modulus; therefore, we simply omit an overhead bar for all variables. Let us
denote by ϕ a predicate on encrypted data and by A˚ a keyword attribute.











˚, αq ¨ rApiqsk
¸
¨ p2ωqk.









˚, αq “ 2ω ¨ pεNq.
Thus, for a database with N records, it is sufficient to choose r such that
2ω ¨ pεNq ď 2r. Note, the larger we make the plaintext modulus 2r, the
more noise there is in the ciphertexts and thus the faster we consume the
ciphertext level. Therefore, it appears that ω ` logpεNq is the tight bound
for the parameter r.
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Because a search-and-count query does not need to consider a specific
attribute, we immediately know that
ř
i SϕpA
˚, αq “ εN ă 2r.
One may wonder why Sϕp¨, . . .q does not take multiple keyword attributes
in the proof. Because we consider the selectivity ratio, it does not need to
do so. In our experiments, we varied the selectivity ratio from 5 to 40%
and plotted the average running time of queries over a database with N “
102, 103, and 104 tuples.
4.4.2 Experiments for Search Queries
We measured the running time per query while varying the number of numeric-
type attributes. We take the ring modulus m “ 8191, and each of the cipher-
texts has 630 plaintext slots. For N “ 1, the experiment of pQ̄˚.1q query is
given in the top three rows of Table 4.4 and that of pQ̄˚.2q is in the bottom
three rows in Table 4.4, where s is the number of attributes, L is the number
of ciphertext moduli, and Comm. means the communication cost.
Table 4.4: Performance of pQ̄˚.1q and pQ̄˚.2q
Message Space τ L s Timing Comm.
Z2 1 6
5 0.38 s 53.99 KB
10 0.76 s 107.97 KB
20 1.51 s 215.95 KB
Z2 4 7
5 2.04 s 73.48 KB
10 4.09 s 146.96 KB
20 8.17 s 293.93 KB
4.4.3 Experiments for Search-and-Sum
We conducted a series of additional experiments to measure performance
of search-and-compute queries. Because each of the ciphertexts can hold `
plaintext slots of elements in Z2r and because a numeric-type attribute with
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a length of 30 bits is encoded into ω̃ (“ r30{ logp2ωqs “ r30{ωs) slots, we can
process ˜̀ (“ t`{ω̃u) attributes in each evaluation. This yields an amortized
rate of running times per attributes.
At first glance, a larger ω seems to be better. However, if ω is too large,
by Theorem 4.4.1, a plaintext modulus 2r becomes large. This results in an
increased depth of circuits. Therefore, we need to choose a sufficiently large
ω whereby the resulting plaintext space is not too large.
We divided our experiment into four cases: (1) Single equality, (2) Mul-
tiple equality, (3) Single comparison, and (4) Multiple comparison.
Case I: Single Equality. This case contains one equality test in the where
clause. We chose a plaintext space so that the number of plaintext slots is
divisible by 10. Then, the entire keyword attribute is packed in only one
ciphertext. Further, we take the ring modulus m whereby there exists g P Z˚m
that has order 10 in the original group Z˚m and in the quotient group Z˚m{x2y.
Then there is a Frobenius automorphism of cyclic right shift over those 10
plaintext bits. We used m “ 13981 so that each of the ciphertexts holds 600
plaintext slots. We report this experimental result in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Experiments for case I pQ̄˚.3q



















ď 20% 25 817.26s 7.50KB
ď 40% 24 1089.68s 10.03KB
Case II: Multiple Equality. This case contains two or more equality
tests in the where clause (i.e., τ ě 2). We performed experiments for τ “
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2 and τ “ 4. When τ “ 2, we used m “ 13981 as before. For the τ “
4 case, we chose m “ 20485 to support more multiplications than before.
Similarly, each ciphertext holds 640 plaintext slots. Compared with queries
in the conjunctive form, disjunctive-formed queries require more addition
operations. However, both of them require the same depth; therefore, their
running times are not significantly different from each other.
Each result is presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 (the 6th column of each
table consists of two parts: The left part is for conjunctive-formed queries,
and the right part is for disjunctive-formed ones.)
Table 4.6: Experiments for case II (τ “ 2)




16 4.81s 4.84s 3.68KB














ď 20% 25 1095.81s 1111.33s 7.97KB
ď 40% 24 1261.08s 1481.77s 10.63KB
Table 4.7: Experiments for case II (τ “ 4)




18 9.79s 9.86s 5.09KB







ď 25% 28 135.59s 139.97s 7.24KB
104
ď 10% Z216 26 19 1788.19s 1800.84s 9.05KB
ď 20% Z217 26 20 1850.70s 1864.36s 9.05KB
ď 40% Z217 25 20 2234.81s 2251.30s 10.93KB
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Case III: Single Comparison. This case contains one greater-than com-
parison in the where clause. For the experiments, we used m “ 20485 in the
case of L “ 20, but in all other experiments, we used m “ 13981. We report
the experimental results in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Experiments for case III














ď 25% 26 166.40s 6.18KB
104
ď 10% Z214 24 17 2805.97s 9.88KB
ď 20% Z217 26 20 3116.66s 10.66KB
ď 40% Z217 25 20 3763.51s 12.88KB
We observed that the results for Case IV are very similar to those for Case
II. Thus, due to space limitations, we omitted the Case IV experimental
results. For a better comparison, in Figure 4.2, we graphically depict the
experimental results described above, while the selectivity ratio ε is fixed at
10%.
4.4.4 Experiments for Search-and-Count
The experiments for search-and-count can also be divided into four cases as
performed above. In these experiment, the plaintext modulus m “ 13981 was
used; therefore, each of the ciphertexts holds 600 plaintext slots. Table 4.9
shows the case with a single equality condition, Table 4.10 shows that with
τ “ 4, and Table 4.11 shows that with a single comparison condition.
Finally, we summarize the above experiments using the graph presented
in Figure 4.3, where we have also fixed the selectivity ratio at 10%.
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Figure 4.2: Experimental results for search-and-sum


























Case II (τ “ 2)
Case II (τ “ 4)
Case III
Table 4.9: Experiments using single equality
N ε Message Space L Timing Comm.
102
ă 8% Z23 7 5.66s 0.73KB
ă 32% Z25 8 7.34s 1.00KB
103
ď 6% Z26 10 84.59s 0.93KB
ď 25% Z28 11 90.89s 1.03KB
104 ď 40% Z212 12 961.84s 1.12KB
Table 4.10: Experiments for multiple equality (τ “ 4)
N ε Message Space L Timing Comm.
102
ă 8% Z23 9 131.35s 132.14s 0.91KB
ă 32% Z25 10 142.28s 144.13s 1.03KB
103
ď 6% Z26 12 1718.08s 1741.13s 1.22KB
ď 25% Z28 15 2184.16s 2178.22s 1.23KB
104 ď 40% Z212 16 21870.80s 22195.40s 1.25KB
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Table 4.11: Experiments using Single Comparison
N ε Message Space L Timing Comm.
102
ă 8% Z23 8 17.10s 0.82KB
ă 32% Z25 9 19.24s 0.91KB
103
ď 6% Z26 11 224.04s 0.93KB
ď 25% Z28 15 311.84s 1.25KB
104 ď 40% Z212 15 3029.05s 1.25KB
Figure 4.3: Experimental results for search-and-count




























Multiple equality (τ “ 2)
Multiple equality (τ “ 4)
Single comparison
4.5 Handling Join Query
In this section,we design the join queries within the search-and-compute
paradigm. For this purpose, suppose that we have the other relation SpB1, . . . , Beq
consisting of M tuples. For simplicity, we assume that N ěM .
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First, we consider a simple join query as follows:
select r.Aj1 , . . . , r.Ajs , s.Bj11 , . . . , s.Bj1s1
from R as r, S as s
where r.Ajk “ s.Bj1k1 ;
(Q.4)
This type of query is expressed and efficiently processed using only the




















, . . .
¯
(Q̄˚.4)
For fixed i and i1, we suppose that each numeric-type attribute is packed
in only one ciphertext. Then, the only difference from pQ̄˚.1q is that pQ̄˚.4q
requires two homomorphic multiplications by the result of search operations;
thus, we need to perform NM equality tests in total. Hence, the depth of
circuit needed to process pQ̄˚.4q is 1` log µ, and the computation complexity
is p2NMqHA`NM p2` log µqHM. In addition, a join query with τ conjunc-
tive conditions needs to perform τNM equality tests; therefore, the required
depth is p1` log µ` log τq.
Next, we consider an advanced join query demanding search-and-compute
operations. For the sake of readability, we consider a join query with two
aggregate functions and a simple condition as follows.
select sumpr.Ajq, countp˚q
from R as r, S as s
where r.Ajk “ s.Bj1k1 ;
(Q.5)
We can express the query pQ̄˚.5q in a manner similar to that used in
Section 4.2.2. Assuming sumpr.Ajq ă 2
µNM , we use a full adder of size ν “
µ ` log pNMq. By contrast, the result of countp˚q ă NM , and it suffices to
use a full adder of size log pNMq. Thus, one candidate of circuit construction
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With respect to sumpr.Ajq, this is the same as pQ̄
˚.3q, except for the num-
ber of operands for additions. Therefore, the depth for evaluation amounts
to 1` log µ` logpNMq p1` logpν ´ 2qq , and the computation complexity is
p2NM ` νpNM ´ 1qqHA` pNM p1` log µq ` pNM ´ 1q p3ν ´ 5qqHM.
We remark that it is straightforward to extend this approach to a join
query with two or more aggregate functions in the select clause.
Finally, we performed some experiments for join queries. We measured the
average running time for processing a single equality test while varying N,M
from 10 to 102 and fixing s “ s1 “ 5. Table 4.12 reports the experimental
results for pQ̄˚.4q. As N and M increase, the running time of the algorithm
grows linearly. Table 4.13 shows the experimental results for pQ̄˚.5q, assuming
the selectivity ratio is fixed at 10%. Because the experiments of pQ̄˚.4q are
implemented for more numeric-type attributes than those for pQ̄˚.5q, the
query takes longer to perform.
Table 4.12: Experiments for pQ̄˚.4q
τ “ 1 and s “ s1 “ 5
N “M “ 10 N “ 102,M “ 10 N “M “ 102
42.75 s 423.86 s 4210.53 s
Table 4.13: Experiments for pQ̄˚.5q
τ “ s “ 1
N “M “ 10 N “ 102,M “ 10 N “M “ 102
3.79 s 50.84 s 680.27 s
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Secure Genome Analysis Based
on Homomorphic Encryption
5.1 Exact Edit Distance Algorithm
We now describe how to execute the homomorphic computation of the exact
edit distance algorithm using the primitive circuits. Then we analyze the
performance of our encrypted edit distance algorithm.
Let |Σ| be the size of a alphabet and denote ω “ rlog |Σ|s. As mentioned
before, let α and β be two strings over ω-bit alphabet. Then each character
of the strings can be seen as an ω-bit value.
5.1.1 Encrypted Edit Distance Algorithm
Since all the values Dpi, jq’s are less than n ` m ´ 1, we may assume that
they are rlogpn`m´ 1qs-bits, say µ. Suppose that we have computed Dpi´
1, j ´ 1q, Dpi, j ´ 1q, Dpi ´ 1, jq, and ω-bit characters αi and βj. From the
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fact that subpαi, βjq “ equalpαi, βjq ‘ 1, we know
pDi´1,j´1 ` subpαi, βjqqrks “ ppsubpαi, βjq ‘ 1q ^Di´1,j´1rksq ‘
psubpαi, βjq ^ ADDpDi´1,j´1, 1qrksq
“ pequalpαi, βjq ^Di´1,j´1rksq ‘
ppequalpαi, βjq ‘ 1q ^ ADDpDi´1,j´1, 1qrksq












if 2 ď k ď µ.
In the same way as in Section 3.1.4, ADDpDi´1,j´1, 1q can be imple-







homomorphic multiplications since we only need
to compute
śk´1
l“1 EncpDpi´ 1, j ´ 1qrlsq. From these observations, Di,j “
mintDpi ´ 1, j ´ 1q ` ti,j, Dpi, j ´ 1q ` 1, Dpi ´ 1, jq ` 1u can be writ-
ten as arithmetic circuits using the above circuits. Hence, given ciphertexts
EncpDpi´ 1, j´ 1qq, EncpDpi, j´ 1qq, EncpDpi´ 1, jqq, Encpαiq, and Encpβjq,
one can apply these operations so as to compute the encryption of Dpi, jq.
Continuing this way, we obtain the encrypted edit distance EncpDpn,mqq.
By the building block algorithms of com (in Lemma 3.1.2) and ADD, the
one diagonal-round circuits have
D “ 2 logpµ´ 1q ` 4,
HA “ 15µ` ω ´ 6,
HM “ 3pµ´ 1q logpµ´ 1q ` 11µ` ω ´ 13.
It is possible to compute Dpi, jq’s simultaneously when i` j is a fixed value
from 1, 2, ..., pn `m ´ 1q, so we expect to consume p2 logpµ ´ 1q ` 4q ¨ pn `
m ´ 1q levels for computing them diagonally, which requires p15µ ` ω ´
6qnm homomorphic additions and p3pµ ´ 1q logpµ ´ 1q ` 11µ ` ω ´ 13qnm
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multiplications in total. In other words, given two encrypted sequences of
lengths n and m, a SWHE scheme of depth Oppn ` mq logplogpn ` mqqq
can evaluate the edit distance algorithm in Opnm logpn`mqq homomorphic
computations.
5.1.2 Optimizations Based on Block Computation
The method described in the previous subsection is computation intensive,
as it needs to evaluate all EncpDpi, jqq for 0 ď i ď n, 0 ď j ď m to obtain
the encrypted edit distance EncpDpn,mqq. We now present an optimization
to reduce the depth during the homomorphic evaluations of the algorithm.
Let us consider the 3ˆ 3 block B in Figure 5.1. It is true that if we have
computed the top and left values of this block, Dpi´2, j´2q, Dpi´2, j´1q,
Dpi´ 2, jq, Dpi´ 1, j´ 2q, Dpi, j´ 2q, then all other values can be expressed
in terms of them. For example, Dpi, jq is the minimum value between the
following 7 numbers: Dpi ´ 2, j ´ 2q ` subpαi´1, βj´1q ` subpαi, βjq, Dpi ´
2, j´ 1q`subpαi´1, βjq` 1, Dpi´ 2, j´ 1q`subpαi, βjq` 1, Dpi´ 1, j´ 2q`







Figure 5.1: Block of size 3
In general, we consider a block of size-pτ ` 1q which consists of the fol-
lowing sets:
top : T “ tDpi´ τ, j ´ τq, Dpi´ τ, j ´ τ ` 1q, . . . , Dpi´ τ, jqu,
left : L “ tDpi´ τ, j ´ τq, Dpi´ τ ` 1, j ´ τq, . . . , Dpi, j ´ τqu,
right : R “ tDpi´ τ, jq, Dpi´ τ ` 1, jq, . . . , Dpi, jqu,
bottom : B “ tDpi, j ´ τq, Dpi, j ´ τ ` 1q, . . . , Dpi, jqu.
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Dpi´ τ, j ´ τq
Dpi´ τ, j ´ τ ` 1q
Dpi´ τ, j ´ τ ` 2q Dpi´ τ ` l, jq





Figure 5.2: Grid of size-pτ ` 1q block
Then all the values of R and B are expressed in terms of values of T and L.
More precisely, consider the grid shown in Figure 5.2. It can be obtained
by a rotation by 45 degree clockwise from the initial Edit distance block.
One can only move one unit right or down on the grid: if moving right from
Dpi ´ k, j ´ lq, then subpi ´ k ` 1, j ´ l ` 1q is added to the value and we
obtain Dpi´k, j´ lq`subpi´k`1, j´ l`1q. In the case of moving one unit
down, “1” is added to it. We note that the number of shortest paths from







for some l ě k since the paths
include k steps in the x axis and pl ´ kq steps in y axis. It is seen as the the
number of the functions of Dpi´τ`l, jq in terms of Dpi´τ, j´kq. From these















´ τ “ 2τ`1 ´ τ
values because the set of all the paths of Dpi, jq is symmetric with respect to
the line from Dpi´ τ, j ´ τq to Dpi, jq. We know that the minimum circuits
consume the largest number of levels than others (equality circuit or addition
circuits), and it needs Oplog kq levels to evaluate the minimum circuits mink
that compute the minimum value between k numbers, which requires Opk2q
homomorphic computations. Thus, one can compute a block of size-pτ ` 1q
by evaluating the circuits with a SWHE of depth Oplogp2τ`1´ τqq « Opτq in
ÿ
k“2,22,...,2τ´1
Opk2q `Opp2τ`1 ´ τq2q « Op22τ q
homomorphic operations. From the fact that all the blocks of size-pτ ` 1q
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can be computed diagonally while shares of the values of T and L have
been computed, we can conclude that the edit distance algorithm can be
implemented using Op22τ ¨nm
τ2
q homomorphic operations with a SWHE scheme
of depth Opτ ¨ pn`m
τ
´ 1qq « Opn`mq for given two encrypted sequences of
lengths n and m. Hence, this optimization reduces the depth but the entire
computation increases as τ becomes larger.
5.1.3 Optimization of Encrypted Edit Distance Algo-
rithm Based on Pathfinding Method
When the sizes of two DNA sequences are the same, we can propose an
optimized method based on pathfinding to effectively reduce the circuit depth
compared with the proposed methods.
The calculation of edit distance is equivalent to find a path from p0, 0q to
pn, nq that achieves minimum accumulated cost for insertions, deletions and

















iqu. For simplicity, we omit the index
l in the following. The transitions of indices and costs due to the substitution
operation subpαi, βiq can be defined by
αi “ αi´1 ` 1, βi “ βi´1 ` 1,
Dpαi, βiq “ Dpαi´1, βi´1q ` subpαi, βiq.
Similarly, we define the insertion operation inspβiq as
αi “ αi´1, βi “ βi´1 ` 1, Dpαi, βiq “ Dpαi´1, βi´1q ` 1,
and deletion operation delpαiq as
αi “ αi´1 ` 1, βi “ βi´1, Dpαi, βiq “ Dpαi´1, βi´1q ` 1.
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Figure 5.3: An example of pathfinding based edit distance computation
Figure 5.3 shows an example of pathfinding based edit distance com-
putation where we included two different paths. The blue path P2pnq is
represented as
tsubpα1, β1q, delpα2q, subpα3, β2q, subpα4, β3q, inspβ4qu,
so the corresponding candidate for Dpn, nq is
subpα1, β1q ` 1` subpα3, β2q ` subpα4, β3q ` 1.
In this example, the path in red color yields the minimum costs.
In general, a path Ppnq can be further represented by a set of segments,
where each segment ends at the position with αi “ βi:
Ppnq “ tP0ps0, σ0, θ0q,P1ps1, σ1, θ1q, ¨ ¨ ¨Prpsr, σr, θrqu
where P ipsi, σi, θiq is the i-th segment between pαsi , βsiq and pαsi`1´1, βsi`1´1q
that contains θi insertion and deletion operations, respectively. Here, r is
the number of segments and si is the first starting index of the coordinates
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pαsi , βsiq in the i-th segment. The parameter σi indicates the location of
the segment in the matrix as 0 for diagonal, 1 for lower triangular, and ´1
for upper triangular. For example, the blue path P2pnq is divided into two
segments: P0ps0 “ 0, σ0 “ 0, θ0 “ 0q “ tsubpα1, β1qu and P1ps1 “ 1, σ1 “
1, θ1 “ 1q “ tdelpα2q, subpα3, β2q, subpα4, β3q, inspβ4qu. Thus we can derive









p2θli ` subpαsi , βsiq
“ 2θl ` subpαls1 , β
l









i. Therefore, the edit distance is the minimum of costs for all candidate
paths, that is, Dpn, nq “ min0ďlďΩnpDlpn, nqq where Ωn denotes the number
of candidate paths.
Remark 5.1.1. Since Dpn, nq is less than n and Dpi, 0q, Dp0, iq is greater
than 2i, we can find each candidate path Pl is constrained by |αli´βli| ď rn2 s´1
and θl ď r
n
2
s´ 1. Moreover, for arbitrary P lipsi, σi, θiq, the edit distance of a
block with the diagonal from pαlsi , β
l
si
q to pαlsi`1´1, β
l
si`1´1




, that is, 2θli ă α
l
si`1´1
´ ulsi . This means that all the segments
P lipsi, σi, θiq with αlsi`1´1 ´ u
l
si
ď 2θli shall be excluded from P l.
Algorithm 3 describes our protocol based on path-based optimization.
Given the Ωn candidate paths, Algorithm 3 computes the cost EncpDipn, nqq
for the path Pl from Dp0, 0q “ 0. For possible edit distance d P t0, 1, . . . , nu,
it evaluates the arithmetic circuit equalp
ś
lpD
lpnq ´ dq, 0q, which has the




pEncpDlpnqq ´ dq, 0qq
as the encrypted flag of verification. Finally, the protocol outputs the set of
flags F “ tFd, d “ 0, 1, . . . , nu. Let us denote ed the decrypted value of the
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Algorithm 3 Edit Distance Algorithm Based on Pathfinding Method
1: for each path l “ 1, 2, . . . ,Ωn do
2: Compute the cost EncpDlpnqq for path P l
3: EncpDlpnqq Ð 2Encpθlq`Encpsubpαli1 , β
l
i1






5: for possible edit distance d “ 0, 1, . . . , n do
6: Fd “ equalp
ś
lpEncpD
lpnqq ´ dq, 0qq
7: end for
8: return F “ tFd, d “ 0, 1, . . . , nu
resulting ciphertext. Then the edit distance is the smallest integer d such
that ed “ 1.
5.1.4 Implementation
In the following we give an estimated performance of the encrypted edit
distance algorithm over DNA sequences and provide concrete timings for
homomorphic evaluation of the algorithm with Shoup’s NTL library [S`01]
and Halevi-Shoup’s HE library [HS13] over GMP. The evaluations were made
on an Ubuntu 14.04 server with Intel Xeon CPU E5-2687W @ 3.10GHz and
256 GB memory. In order to check the accuracy and efficiency of our protocol,
pairs of sequences pα, βq with various lengths n,m were randomly generated
for edit distance calculation.
In our scenario, the third parties first partition their own DNA sequences
into segments of length n or m. Then each of the DNA sequences is encrypted
as a different ciphertext with a homomorphic encryption scheme. For parallel
computation, we use an encryption scheme with plaintext space Z`t support-
ing SIMD operations with ` slots. Then one party sends the ciphertexts which
hold the ` segments together to a cloud. Finally, the cloud service computes
the edit distances of ` different sequence pairs simultaneously. The amortized
time is computed as the total time of this algorithm evaluation divided by `.
In our implementation, we used the optimization techniques as described
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in Section 5.1.3, especially, the equality circuit described in Section 3.2.3:




px´ iq pmod tq
for some constant M0. From the Wilson’s Theorem, it always holds for a
prime number t greater than 2 that pt ´ 1q! ” ´1 pmod tq, so we see that
M0 ” ´1 pmod tq.
The implementation results with 80-bits of security are described in Table
5.1. Here, Ωn is the number of candidate paths satisfying the conditions of
Remark 5.1.1. The plaintext modulus t is set to the minimal prime number
greater than n. Consequently, the number of levels L in modulus chain and
the number of slots ` for parallel computation also vary with n. For example,
it takes 7.38 seconds to obtain the encrypted edit distance from the two
encrypted DNA sequences of length 10.
Table 5.1: Implementation results of edit distance based on pathfinding
n t L ` Ωn KeyGen Encrypt Evaluation Amortized
3
5
7 390 3 8.299s 1.072s 3.812s 0.009s
4 8 240 7 8.776s 1.294s 8.577s 0.036s
5
7
10 180 19 11.786s 1.807s 25.038s 0.139s
6 11 130 47 14.499s 2.299s 54.187s 0.417s
7
11
13 300 127 18.270s 3.382s 158.273s 0.528s
8 15 1436 327 20.340s 5.005s 430.512s 0.299s
9 16 792 887 31.295s 9.020s 2311.190s 2.912s
10 17 838 1719 37.812s 10.723s 6187.170s 7.383s
5.2 Approximate Edit Distance Algorithm
In this section, we describe how to encode and encrypt the genomic data.
Based on these methods, we propose the evaluation algorithms to compute
the genomic tests on encrypted data.
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5.2.1 Encoding Genomic Data
The first step is to curate the data using the positions in the VCF files of
two participants. In other words, the server should arrange the information
and make the merged list L so that each individual can encode their geno-
typic information according to the list. Recall that posi means the reference
position and svi the type of structural variant relative to the reference. Let












0 if svi P tINS,DELu,
1 o.w,.
The value ei defines whether the genotype at the specified locus is missing;
the value fi specifies the variants compared with the reference.
Since both VCF files are aligned with the same reference genome, we don’t
need to compare the columns of ‘REF’. To improve performance, we assume
that it suffices to compare 7 SNPs between two non-reference sequences.
In the following, we describe how to encode the sequences. Each SNP is
represented by two bits as A Ñ 00, T Ñ 01, G Ñ 10, C Ñ 11, and then
concatenated with each other. Next we pad with 1 at the end of the bit
string to represent the length of SNPs and distinguish ‘A’ from an empty
SNP. Finally, we pad with zeros to make it a binary string of length 15,
denoted by si. Let sirjs denote j-th bit of si. If a person’s SNP at the given
locus is not known (i.e., ei “ 0), it is encoded as 0-string. For example,
‘TCG’ is encoded as a bit string 01||11||10||10 . . . 0 of length 15, which can
be represented as an integer of 94.
Finally let us consider the i-th genotype lengths Di, D
1
i of two participants
defined as follows: when it has no variants at the given locus of the sequence,
set zero as the length at the locus. If it includes a deletion compared with
the reference, use the length of reference. Otherwise, we take the length of
the target sequence at the current locus. In Figure 5.4, we illustrate the file
format of the data and its encodings.
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Figure 5.4: A snapshot of the dataset and its encodings: paqhu604D39 and
pbqhu661AD0
5.2.2 Secure DNA Sequence Comparison
with Bit-sliced Implementation
We represent sequence comparison algorithms as binary circuits and then
evaluate them over encrypted data. We use the native plaintext space of
binary polynomials (i.e., R2 “ Z2rxs{pΦmpxqq), and denote XOR and AND
as ‘ and ^, respectively. For simplicity, you may consider the plaintext space
Z`2 supporting batching operation with ` slots.
For the homomorphic evaluation of Hamming distance, the genomic data






iq, are encrypted bit-
wise. For example, the encryptions of ei’s are in the form of
BGV.Enc pCRTpe1, . . . , e`q, pkq ,
BGV.Enc pCRTpe``1, . . . , e2`q, pkq , . . . ,
BGV.Enc
`
CRTpet`pLq{`u¨``1, . . . , e`pLq, 0, . . . , 0q, pk
˘
.
This allows to compute the same function on ` inputs at the price of one
computation.
Now, we consider the comparison binary circuit (described in [CKL15])
for the secure computation of the approximate edit distance. We express an
unsigned µ-bit integer x in its binary representation and denote the j-th
coordinate of x by xrjs (i.e., x “
řµ
j“1 xrjs ¨2
j´1, xrjs P t0, 1u). For two µ-bit
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1 if x ă y,
0 o.w.,
and this is written recursively as compx, yq :“ cµ where
cj “
`




pxrjs ‘ 1‘ yrjsq ^ cj´1
˘
for j ě 2 with an initial value c1 “ pxr1s ‘ 1q ^ yr1s. Then the j-th bit of
maximum value between two inputs is defined as follows:
maxtx, yurjs “
`








compx, yq ^ pxrjs ‘ yrjsq
˘
.
For the bit-sliced implementation, all the lengths are also expressed in a bi-
nary representation and we denote the maximum length of SNPs by µ. It





iq ^ pfi ‘ f
1









j“1 psirjs ‘ s
1
irjs ‘ 1q has 1 if and only if si, s
1
i are
the same. Finally, one can decrypt the results and decode `pLq values from
the output plaintext polynomials. More precisely, let `i,j be the value at
i-th slot which corresponds to the j-th bit. We see that
řµ
j“1 `i,j ¨ 2
j´1 is
the approximate edit distance of SNV site i, hence we need only perform
aggregation operations over them.
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5.2.3 Secure DNA Sequence Comparison
with Integer-based Implementation
We explain how to evaluate the genomic algorithms homomorphically us-
ing the homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers. Since polynomial
multiplication does not correspond to component-wise multiplication of the
vectors, we have to consider another packing method instead of [LNV11]. Let
us consider the polynomial-CRT packing method. Suppose that an integer m
is chosen to be a power of two and let n “ φpmq “ m{2. The m-th cyclotomic
polynomial Φmpxq factors modulo 2 into a product of the same irreducible
factors pi.e., Φmpxq “ x
n`1 “ px`1qn mod 2q, so we cannot apply batching
technique with these parameters. We can instead do that if taking a prime
t (not 2) such that the polynomial splits into the distinct factors modulo t,
but the use of a different message space leads to change our primitive circuits.
As noted in Section 3.2.1, we see that for x, y P t0, 1u, the following
properties hold: x ‘ y “ px ´ yq2 and x ^ y “ x ¨ y where ´ and ¨ are
arithmetic operations over integers. From these observations, we can amend
the evaluation circuit for the edit distance as follows: We note that for µ-bit
integer x and y, the comparison circuit compx, yq “ cµ can be expressed as
cj “ p1´ xrjsq ¨ yrjs `
`
1´ pxrjs ´ yrjsq2
˘
¨ cj´1.
for j ě 2 with c1 “ p1´ xr1sq ¨ yr1s. Since it is available to compute on large
integer inputs, the maximum value is defined by
maxtx, yu “ p1´ compx, yqq ¨ x` compx, yq ¨ y “ x` compx, yq ¨ py ´ xq.





















j“1 p1´ psirjs ´ s
1
irjsq
2q . Then we get the encryp-
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tions of the approximate Edit distance result of SNV i.
5.2.4 Implementation
In this section, we explain how to set the parameters for homomorphic eval-
uations and present our experimental results. We used BGV scheme with
Shoup-Halevi’s HE library [HS13] (called HELib). Our experiments with BGV
were performed on a Linux machine with an Intel Xeon 2.67 GHz processor.
We also implemented YASHE scheme with ARITH library in C. The measure-
ments were done in an Intel Core 3.60GHz, running 64-bit Windows 7. The
dataset consists of two individual genomes randomly selected from Personal
Genome Project.
How to Set Parameters. The security of BGV relies on the hardness of
the RLWE assumption. Similarly, YASHE is provably secure in the sense of
IND-CPA under the RLWE assumption and DSPR assumption. The main
difference between the schemes is that BGV uses an odd integer m while
YASHE chooses m to be a power-of-two with a prime integer q such that
q ” 1 pmod mq. In [LPR10], it was shown that the hardness of RLWE with
the cyclotomic polynomial Φmpxq “ x
φpmq ` 1 can be established by a quan-
tum reduction to shortest vector problems in ideal lattices. This means that
YASHE is believed to be secure as long as the lattice problems are hard to
solve. In YASHE scheme, we look for the parameter t ‰ 2 which maximizes
the number of slots we can handle in one go. We fix the word ω “ 2128 for the
evaluation key and the standard deviation σ “ 8 for the error distribution
χerr. Since we can estimate the size of noise during homomorphic operations,
we get the lower bound on q to ensure the correctness. We also have maximal
values of q to ensure the desired security using the results of [LN14], so that
we can have more loose bound than that from LP’s method. Then we set m
as a power-of-two to get a non-trivial interval for q and then select a smallest
q in this interval.
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Table 5.2 presents the parameter setting and Table 5.3 shows performance
results for secure DNA sequence comparison using BGV and YASHE. All the
parameters provide 80-bit security level. We give the plaintext modulus t,
the size of the ciphertext modulus q, the lattice dimension n “ φpmq, and
the number of plaintext slots `. We also give the circuit depth L so that
HE scheme can correctly evaluate such a computation on encrypted data. In
particular, it can be considered as the number of ciphertext moduli in the
BGV scheme. We consider the ciphertext size in kBytes for a set of param-
eters. The last columns give the timings for the key generation, encryption,
evaluation and decryption.
We evaluated the performance with the input data of different sizes 5K
and 10K. We implemented the comparison circuit with the same method as
described in [CKL15, Lemma 1] in order to reduce the circuit depth over
encryption.
As discussed in [KL15], given the parameter L, we obtain the approximate
size of ciphertext modulus as log2 q « 43 ` 18 ¨ pL ´ 2q for BGV when using
t “ 2 and R “ Zrxs{pΦ8191pxqq. Since it should support L “ 7 or 8 to correctly
evaluate approximate edit distance algorithm, we use the modulus q around
130 to 150. On the other hand, the size of the parameter q in YASHE should be
strictly larger than 2L log2pntq « 52L with t “ 2
9 and R “ Zrxs{px8192 ` 1q.
So we used a 384-bit prime q such that q ” 1 pmod 214q.
In the implementation of YASHE scheme, computing the inverse of f
modulo q turns out to be the most-time consuming part of the key-generation,
which runs in around 128.34 seconds. In total, it takes about 130.59 seconds
to generate the public key, secret key and evaluation keys, while the key
generation of the BGV scheme takes about 3.41 seconds in order to support
8 levels.
There is also quite a big gap between the two schemes in timings for a
multiplication of ciphertexts: BGV takes around 0.07 seconds, while YASHE
takes around 1.75 seconds (including the key switching step) under the pa-
rameter settings used in our experiments. For the efficiency of the YASHE
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scheme, we might avoid a costly key switching step during the homomor-
phic multiplication; however, it supports a limited number of homomorphic
multiplications without the key switching step. This follows since the noise
grows exponentially with the multiplicative depth through such consecutive
operations. One alternative is to use a hybrid approach, in which we leave
out key switching in certain places but do it in others using the evaluation
key with a power of the secret key so that one can keep the ciphertext noise
small for correct decryption. As a result, polynomial multiplication modulo
xn ` 1 takes about 0.64 seconds, but it is still slower than that in BGV. As
expected, BGV is faster than YASHE to evaluate the genomic algorithms for
DNA sequence comparison.
Table 5.2: Parameters of implementations
Scheme t log2 q n ` L |ct|
BGV 2 150 8190 630 8 300kB
YASHE 8191 384 8192 4096 6 384kB
Table 5.3: Implementation results of approximate edit distance










10K 116.61s 245.04s 5.07s
5.3 Secure Searching of Biomarkers
In this section, we describe how to securely search a set of biomarkers on en-
crypted genomes. The aim of this work is to create a homomorphic security
system for searching a set of biomarkers on encrypted genomes. We propose
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an efficient method to securely search a matching position with biomarker and
extract the information of DNA sequences at the position without compli-
cated computation such as comparison. The important feature of our method
is to encode a genomic database as a single element of polynomial ring. The
searching operation in a database is done by a single multiplication with the
encoded query data. Finally the efficient extraction operation enables us to
obtain the DNA sequences at the matching position which is moved to the
constant term of output polynomial. This method has the advantage over
previous methods in parameter size and computational complexity.
5.3.1 Privacy-Preserving Database Searching
and Extraction
Throughout this section, we use the BGV-type homomorphic encryption
scheme but we put the message in the upper bits similar to the YASHE
scheme. That is, an ciphertext ct “ pc0, c1q of a message m has the decryp-
tion structure of the form c0`c1 ¨s “ pQ{tq¨m`e for some small polynomial e.
We assume that the integer m is a power of two so that n “ m{2 and
Φmpxq “ x
n` 1. We adapt the conversion and modulus-switching techniques
of [DM15]. The conversion algorithm changes an RLWE encryption of m “
ř
imix
i into an LWE encryption of its constant term m0, and the modulus
switching reduces the ciphertext modulus Q down to q while preserving the
message. We note that an LWE ciphertext is represented as a vector in Zq for
some modulus q, and the decryption procedure is done by an inner product
of the ciphertext and the secret key vector.







i, output the vector ct1 “ pc0,0, c1,0,´c1,n´1, . . . ,´c1,1q.
• LWE.ModSwitchpctq: Given a ciphertext ct P Zn`1Q , output the vector
ct1 Ð tpq{Qq ¨ cts P Zn`1q .
As mentioned before, the decryption structure of an RLWE ciphertext
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ct “ pc0, c1q has the form c0 ` c1 ¨ s “ pQ{tq ¨m` e and its constant term is




c1,n´isi “ pQ{tq ¨m0 ` e0.
It can be represented as an inner product of a vector
pc0,0, c1,0,´c1,n´1,´c1,n´2, . . . ,´c1,1q
and the desired LWE secret key ~s “ p1, s0, . . . , sn´1q. Hence the output of
the conversion algorithm can be seen as an LWE encryption of m0. It is also
easy to check that if ct P Zn`1Q satisfies xct, ~sy “ pQ{tq ¨ m ` e pmod Qq,
then the output of LWE.ModSwitch algorithm satisfies xct1, ~sy “ pq{tq ¨m` e1
pmod qq for some e1 « pq{Qq ¨ e. These techniques have been proposed for an
efficient bootstrapping [DM15], but they will play totally different roles in
our application. Finally an LWE ciphertext of modulus q can be decrypted
by ~s as follows.
• LWE.Decpct, skq: Given a ciphertext ct P Zn`1q , output the value m Ð
tpt{qq ¨ rxct, ~sysqs.
If xct, ~sy “ pq{tq ¨m` e pmod qq for some small enough e, it returns the
correct message m modulo t. More precisely, the decryption procedure works
if |te{q| ă 1{2.
Now let us consider a database of a set of N tuples. Each tuple consists
of a set of pairs pdi, αiq for i “ 1, . . . , N , where di denotes a data-tag in the
domain t0, 1, . . . , T ´ 1u and αi represents the corresponding value attribute
in a plaintext space Ztzt0u. Note that all the tags should be distinct from
each other. For instance, in the case of personal information database, αi may
be the age of client whose identity number is di. Now consider the following
search query: Given a keyword-tag d from a tag domain, select αi if there
exists an index i such that di “ d; otherwise zero (K).
The purpose of this section is to store the database and carry out a
search query on the public cloud while the database information is securely
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protected against malicious adversaries. Our main idea is the following en-
coding method of database suitable for the efficient computation of equality




The client encrypts this polynomial with the RLWE public-key encryption
scheme and stores the ciphertext ctDB in the server. At the query phase,
given a keyword-tag d, the client encrypts the monomial x´d with the RGSW
symmetric encryption scheme and sends the ciphertext CTQ to the server.
We assume that the RGSW encryption scheme has the same secret key sk as
the one of RLWE encryption scheme.
Remark 5.3.1. Given an RGSW ciphertext CT P R2dgˆ2Q and an RLWE ci-
phertext ct P R2Q output the vector ct1 Ð CT
T
¨WDBgpctq. If CT and ct are
RGSW and RLWE encryptions of m and m1, respectively, their multiplica-
tion ct1 is a valid RLWE encryption of mm1. For convenience, we will denote
Hybrid.MultpCT, ctq algorithm by d, i.e.,
pCT, ctq P R2dgˆ2Q ˆR
2
Q ÞÑ CT d ct P R2Q.
Given two ciphertexts CTQ Ð RGSW.Encpx
´dq, ctDB Ð RLWE.EncpDBpxqq,
the server first performs their multiplication to obtain an ciphertext, denoted
by ctmult “ CTQ d ctDB. It follows from the previous section that ctmult is a
valid RLWE encryption of the polynomial





Since we use the cyclotomic polynomial Φmpxq “ x
n ` 1 of power-of-two
degree, the polynomial ring R has the property xn “ ´1. Thus, for any tag
d, the constant term of the polynomial DBpxq ¨x´d is αi if there is some index
i satisfying d “ di, otherwise zero.
Now the server applies the RLWE.Conv algorithm on ctmult to compute an
LWE encryption ctconv of this constant term. This conversion procedure pre-
vents the leakage of unqueried information and reduces the decryption cost.
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In addition, the (optional) modulus-switching procedure can be considered
to get a ciphertext ctres with a smaller modulus size and reduce the commu-
nication cost. Finally the client decrypts this LWE ciphertext and gets the
desired value αi or zero (K). The Algorithm 4 summarizes the procedure of
secure search-and-extraction.
Algorithm 4 Procedure of secure search and extraction
1: Database encryption: The data owner encodes the genomic information
as DBpxq and submits its encryption to the server:
ctDB Ð RLWE.EncpDBpxqq.
2: Query encryption: The user encodes the keyword-tag d and sends its




3: Evaluation phase: The server computes their multiplication and carries
out the conversion and modulus-switching operations:
ctmult Ð Hybrid.MultpCTQ, ctDBq.
ctconv Ð RLWE.Convertpctmultq.
ctres Ð LWE.ModSwitchpctconvq.
Return the resulting ciphertext ctres to the user.
4: Decryption phase: The user decrypts the ciphertext with the secret key
and gets the desired value:
αÐ LWE.Decpctresq.
Equality test has been traditionally considered difficult to perform on
homomorphic encryption, because of its large circuit depth. However, our
method is very efficient in parameter size and complexity since it requires
only a single hybrid multiplication.
One limitation of this method is that the tags di should be bounded by
ciphertext dimension n to construct the encoding polynomial DBpxq. Since
the dimension n has a significant influence on the performance of HE scheme,
too large value of n has an impractical impact on the performance. We will
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describe how to overcome this problem in the next section with respect to
the application to genomic data.
5.3.2 Secure Searching of Biomarkers
We return to our main goal of our problem: secure searching of biomarkers by
finding a query genome in database. We describe how to encode and encrypt
the genotype information of VCF file in order to apply the privacy-preserving
database searching and extraction.
The VCF file contains multiple genotype information lines, where each of
them consists of a triple pchi, posi, SNPsiq of chromosome number, position,
and a sequence of SNP alleles. A chromosome identifier ch ranges from 1 to
22, X, and Y. A non-negative integer pos represents the reference position
with the first base having position 1, and SNPs is a reference or alternate
sequence in tA, T,G,Cu˚. A query from user is also a triple of the same form
and we aim to decide absence/presence of this biomarker in the database file.
We represent the sex chromosomes X and Y as 0 and 23, respectively.
Then we define an encoding function E : Z ˆ Z Ñ Z by pch, posq ÞÑ d “
ch` 24 ¨ pos.
In the following, we describe how to encode the SNPs. For convenience
we set the upper bound for the length of SNPs, so let nSNP be the maximal
number of reference (or alternate) alleles to be compared between the query
genome and user genome in the target database. It is encoded as a binary
string of length `SNP “ 2 ¨nSNP`1 with the same way of subsection 5.2.1. We
convert it into an integer value, denoted by αi. For example, ‘GC’ is encoded
as a bit string 10||11||1||0 . . . 0 of length `SNP, where the single ‘1’ in the third
block is padded. This bit string will be represented as an integer of 29.
Now consider the case that we wish to encode the reference and alter-
nate alleles together. Let αrefi and α
alt
i denote the integer encodings of nSNP
reference alleles and nSNP alternate alleles, respectively. Then we define an




A database file is encoded as a set of pair pdi, αiq for i “ 1, . . . , N such that
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di “ Epchi, posiq and αi is the encoded integer of the i-th SNP allele string.
Then the encodings di and αi are regarded as data-tag and value attribute,









αi if k “ di for some i,
αÐ Zt otherwise,
and then encrypts the polynomial with the RLWE public-key encryption
scheme as described above.
The query genes are also encoded as a pair of integers pd, αq, however, we
consider only the information of d is encrypted using the RGSW symmetric
encryption scheme, that is, the user encrypts the monomial x´d.
5.3.3 Optimization Techniques
As we mentioned before, the ring dimension n needs to be larger than the
encoded integers di’s. However, the encoded integers di from VCF files have
bits size about 32, while a dimension n with about 11 ď log n ď 16 is
considered appropriate for implementation of HE schemes to achieve both
security and efficiency. Hence direct application of our method to the VCF
file would yield an impractical result.
For compression of tag data and its re-randomization, we make the use
of a pseudo random number generator Hp¨q which transforms a tag di into a
pair of two non-negative integers d˚i and d
:
i less than n. Our implementation
adopts SHA-3 and extracts log n “ 11 bits of the hashed value for each of
two integers d˚i and d
:
i .















t0, . . . , n ´ 1u2, the pair of constructed polynomials DB˚ and DB: satisfy
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Algorithm 5 Encoding genomic data
1: c˚
d˚1
Ð α1 P Zq, c:
d:1
Ð α1 ´ c
˚
d˚1
2: d˚1 P D˚, d
:
1 P D:
3: for i P t2, . . . , nu do
4: if d˚i R D˚and d
:
i R D: then
5: c˚
d˚i
Ð αi P Zq, c:
d:i
Ð αi ´ c
˚
d˚i
6: else if d˚i P D˚and d
:
i R D: then
7: c:
d:i
Ð αi ´ c
˚
d˚i
8: else if d˚i R D˚and d
:
i P D: then
9: c˚
d˚i



















αi “ cd˚i ` cd:i
. The procedure of database encoding for secure search of
biomarkers is described in Algorithm 5.
Let ct˚DB and ct
:
DB denote the ciphertexts of the polynomials DB
˚ and
DB:, respectively. Similarly, given the query encoding d, the user computes




. We denote the ciphertexts by CT˚Q and CT
:
Q. The server computes












Now let ct denote the ciphertext computed by the homomorphic addition
between ct˚mult and ct
:
mult. Finally the server converts it into an LWE cipher-
text and performs the modulus-switching procedure as described above. The
Algorithm 6 describes the procedure of secure search-and-extraction using
our proposed optimization techniques.
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Algorithm 6 Procedure of optimized secure search of biomarkers
1: Database encryption: The data owner encodes the genomic information
































Let ct Ð ct˚mult ` ct
:
mult. The server converts it into an LWE ciphertext
and performs modulus-switching operations:
ctconv Ð RLWE.Convertpctq.
ctres Ð LWE.ModSwitchpctconvq.
Return the resulting ciphertext ctres to the user.
4: Decryption phase: The user decrypts the ciphertext with the secret key
and gets the desired value: αÐ LWE.Decpctresq.
5.3.4 Implementation
In this section, we explain how to set the parameters present our results using
the optimization techniques. The dataset was randomly selected from Per-
sonal Genome Project. Our implementation is publicly available on github [KS16].
How to Set Parameters. Given the ciphertext modulus Q, it follows
from the estimation of noise growth during evaluations [DM15] and decryp-
tion condition that we get the upper bound on the plaintext modulus t to
ensure the correctness of decryption after computation. So we set t as the
largest power-of-two integer less than the upper bound. If the encodings of
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the allele strings are too large, we divide them into smaller integers so that
each of them is smaller than t. Then we repeat the algorithm to construct the
corresponding polynomials of each integer. On the other hand, the security
of the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme relies on the hardness of
the RLWE assumption. We derive a lower-bound on the ring dimension as
n ě λ`110
7.2
¨ logQ to get λ-bit security level from the security analysis of
[GHS12].
The use of variable type ‘int32 t ’ accelerates the speed of implementations
and basic C++ std libraries, so we set Q “ 232 as the ciphertext modulus. We
also set t “ 211 as the modulus parameter of the plaintext space to ensure
the correctness for the output ciphertext. We take the following parameters




Each coefficient of the secret key sk is chosen at random from t0,˘1u
and we set 64 as the number of nonzero coefficients in the secret key. As
in the work of [DM15], we considered the Gaussian distribution of standard
deviation σ “ 1.4 to sample random error polynomials.
For the better efficiency of homomorphic multiplication, we also used the
optimized library for complex FFT, i.e., the Fast Fourier Transform in the
West [FJ05]. That is, we use the complex primitive 2n-th root of unity rather
than a primitive root in a prime field of order Q. We measure a running time
of 0.804 seconds to set up the FFT environment at dimension 2n “ 212. The
key generation of two schemes takes about 0.247 ms in total.
Table 5.4 presents the time complexity and storage for the evaluation
of secure searching of biomarkers. All the experiments were performed on a
single Intel Core i5 running at 2.9 GHz processor. The chosen parameters
provide at least 80 bits of security level.
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Table 5.4: Implementation results of secure searching of biomarkers
DB size nSNP
Complexity Storage







5 0.007s 0.039s 0.011ms 6MB 1.5MB
10 0.014s 0.079s 0.027ms 12MB 3MB
100K
2 0.021s 0.111s 0.034ms 17MB 4.25MB
5 0.042s 0.227s 0.064ms 34MB 8.5MB
10 0.099s 0.454s 0.139ms 68MB 17MB
4M
2 0.745s 3.954s 1.171ms 593MB 148MB
5 1.506s 7.911s 1.949ms 1185MB 296MB




Our results to date scratch the surface of a HE-based general framework for
private query evaluation and only implement general but relatively simple
queries. These are just starting points on FHE-based private query processing
and we need to implement a prototype of our solution working on top of a
real DBMS, such as MySQL, which can be a final goal of our research.
We proposed a protocol for secure edit-distance computation over en-
crypted data. We also discussed how to privately perform genomic tests on
encrypted genome data by using the approximate edit distance. The pro-
posed protocols demonstrate the feasibility of securely outsourcing genomic
data and edit distance computation in an untrusted cloud environment.
Finally we suggest an efficient method to securely search of biomarkers
using hybrid GSW homomorphic encryption scheme. We came up with a
solution to the secure outsourcing matching problem by using polynomial
encoding and extraction of query SNP based on the multiplication of a
RLWE-GSW ciphertext and an ordinary RLWE ciphertext. Our solution
shows the development of cryptographic techniques can support real-world
genomic data analysis.
Although FHE has a long way to go in its practical uses, the good news is
that there have been significant improvements in HE schemes (e.g., [CLT14,
DM15, HS15]). We expect to have much faster performance in near future by
69
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applying more efficient HE schemes to our current protocols instead of the
BGV scheme and YASHE scheme.
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[LATV12] Adriana López-Alt, Eran Tromer, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan.
On-the-fly multiparty computation on the cloud via multikey
fully homomorphic encryption. In Proceedings of the 44th Sym-
posium on Theory of Computing Conference, STOC 2012, pages
1219–1234. ACM, 2012.
[LN14] Tancrede Lepoint and Michael Naehrig. A comparison of the ho-
momorphic encryption schemes fv and yashe. In International
Conference on Cryptology in Africa, pages 318–335. Springer,
2014.
[LNV11] Kristin Lauter, Michael Naehrig, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan.
Can homomorphic encryption be practical? In Proceedings of
the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop,
pages 113–124. ACM, 2011.
[LPR10] Vadim Lyubashevsky, Chris Peikert, and Oded Regev. On ideal
lattices and learning with errors over rings. In Advances in Cryp-
tology - EUROCRYPT 2010, pages 1–23, 2010.
[MS01] BA Malin and Latanya Sweeney. Inferring genotype from clinical
phenotype through a knowledge based algorithm. In Proceedings
of the Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing, pages 41–52, 2001.
74
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[MS04] Bradley Malin and Latanya Sweeney. How (not) to protect
genomic data privacy in a distributed network: using trail re-
identification to evaluate and design anonymity protection sys-
tems. Journal of biomedical informatics, 37(3):179–192, 2004.
[PRZB11] Raluca Ada Popa, Catherine Redfield, Nickolai Zeldovich, and
Hari Balakrishnan. Cryptdb: protecting confidentiality with en-
crypted query processing. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pages 85–
100. ACM, 2011.
[RAD78] Ronald L Rivest, Len Adleman, and Michael L Dertouzos. On
data banks and privacy homomorphisms. Foundations of secure
computation, 4(11):169–180, 1978.
[S`01] Victor Shoup et al. Ntl: A library for doing number theory, 2001.
[SAW13] Latanya Sweeney, Akua Abu, and Julia Winn. Identifying par-
ticipants in the personal genome project by name. Available at
SSRN 2257732, 2013.
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국문초록
동형 암호는 복호화 과정을 거치지 않고 암호화된 상태에서 암호문끼리 연
산을 가능하게 하는 암호 체계이다. 이론적으로는 동형 암호를 이용하여 임의의
함수를 암호화된 상태에서 계산할 수 있지만 상대적으로 큰 계산 비용으로 인해
아직까지 실용적이지 않으며 그에 대한 연구가 활발히 이루어지고 있지 않다.
본 학위 논문에서 동형 암호 기반 상등 또는 대소 비교, 그리고 정수 덧셈
연산에 대한 최적화된 서킷을 제안한다. 이를 바탕으로 동형 암호화된 데이터 베
이스에서 안전하게 쿼리를 처리할 수 있는 방법에 대해 제안한다. 특히 키워드의
검색과 계산을 동시에 효율적으로 안전하게 처리할 수 있는 통합된 프로토콜을
설계한다.
한편 게놈 데이터 정보는 그 자체로 민감한 개인 정보이므로 이의 프라이버시
를보호하면서클라우드컴퓨팅환경에서분석가능한방법에대한연구가새로운
화두로 떠오르고 있다. 암호화된 DNA 데이터 위에서 편집 거리(edit distance)를
계산할수있는방법을제안하고이기술을개발하여근사편집거리(approximate
edit distance)를 분석할 수 있는 알고리즘을 제시한다. 마지막으로 암호화된 데이
터 위에서 바이오마커(biomarker)를 찾을 수 있는 동형 암호 기반 보안 시스템을
제안한다. 이는 기존의 대소 비교와 같은 복잡한 연산 없이 바이오마커와 일치하
는 위치를 검색하여 그 위치에 있는 DNA 염기 서열의 정보를 효율적으로 추출이
가능하다.
주요어휘: 동형암호, 정보 보호 쿼리 처리, SQL 쿼리, 편집거리, 근사 편집
거리, 바이오마커
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